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 ABSTRACT: In the last decade, theorists and scholars of transitional justice have not 
only explored avenues for the fi eld to address the socio-economic roots of confl ict, 
but have increasingly argued that success in this regard is the metric by which it 
should ultimately be judged. However, the record of the fi eld in identifying or 
remedying violations of economic, social and cultural rights is underwhelming 
at best. While one might agree that the roots of confl ict and authoritarianism 
are structural and that such deprivations  do lend themselves to judicial or quasi-
judicial action, neither the mechanisms of transitional justice nor the context in 
which they apply are apt to signifi cantly catalyse benefi cial change. As regards 
the former, the temporary, exceptionalist and extra-governmental nature of the 
mechanisms leave them unsuited to tackle structural abuses. In terms of the con-
text in which transitional justice applies, advocates of a greater role in address-
ing root causes of confl ict need to acknowledge that political transition from less 
to more democratic regimes is a relatively superfi cial phenomenon. Th e very real 
sense of civil-political possibility that transitions from war or authoritarianism to 
peace and democracy present is rarely accompanied by a transition in the shape of 
economic power. Transitional justice can take advantage of the period of fl ux to 
redress or temper political power imbalances symbolically, historically and juris-
prudentially. Th ese achievements are now dismissed by some as merely cosmetic 
outcomes of an overly liberal-legalist approach, but simultaneous opportunities to 
redress socio-economic imbalances simply may not exist. A more realistic appraisal 
of transitional justice ’ s merits is possible only if we accept the relative superfi ciality 
of its mechanisms and context of application. Addressing structural injustice is 
the task of the transitional government and development agencies — schemes for 
transitional justice can at best form just one of many valid sources of advice, but 
assuming they can catalyse, dominate or contribute substantially to re-ordering 
horizontal inequalities is to set expectations too high. 
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economic justice 
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 ‘ For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong . ’ H. L. Mencken 
 1. Introduction 
 Th ere is a growing belief among advocates, practitioners and policy-makers 
in transitional justice that the fi eld needs to transcend its liberal-legalist ori-
gins in addressing violations of the civil and political rights of individuals. 
It is now argued with increasing frequency that policies in the area should 
demand wider systemic reform of those socio-economic structures in society 
that cause, exacerbate, and are produced by authoritarianism and confl ict. As 
Miller outlines, the justifi cations for including issues of structural violence 
and inequality within the remit of transitional justice are pragmatic (only 
with attention to root causes can peace be sustainable), philosophical (an 
ethical preference for distribution and equity) and sociological (it is the con-
cept of justice the population concerned most prefers). 1 Th is new emphasis 
has largely been compelled by the acknowledgment that while transitional 
justice can succeed to a greater or lesser degree in acknowledging or punish-
ing the evil that fl owed from abuse of political power, many of the economic 
advantages enjoyed by the  ancien regime or portions of the population it rep-
resented remain in place to potentially sow the seeds of future confl ict. 2 Th e 
precise nature of the claims that transitional justice can signifi cantly impact 
socio-economic structures in post-confl ict and post-authoritarian societies 
will be explored in greater detail in Sections 2 and 3, but it should be noted 
at this juncture that the arguments made for transitional justice ’ s potential 
in addressing problems of under-development and inequality are distinctly 
ambitious. African scholars have argued transitional justice can and must 
 ‘ elaborate remedial actions that comprehensively address grievances in socie-
ties emerging from confl ict. ’ 3 Others contend that transitional justice meas-
ures should  ‘ actively reverse the systems and attitudes that discriminate and 
dehumanize ’ across the entire society. 4 
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 As Section 3 examines, the presumption among many in the literature 
is that the sheer fact of transition to peace and/or democracy automatically 
conduces to a revision of systemic inequalities. Implicit in this presumption 
is a further supposition that the transitional justice mechanisms available are 
capable of addressing economic inequalities and development issues with at 
least some degree of effi  cacy and all that prevents them modifying inequitable 
social structures (or mitigating their ill-eff ects) is the overly-narrow, liberal-
legalist lens transitional justice habitually employs. However, this article con-
tends that the problem is not that justice has been defi ned too narrowly or 
that civil and political rights have been elevated to a higher plane than socio-
economic ones. Th e problem is instead the transition itself, regrettably but 
invariably a matter of elite bargaining over political and institutional reforms. 
As Payne, Reiter and Olsen demonstrate through controlling for old and new 
regime types, confl ict type, duration, democratic history and the presence 
of a negotiated regime change, transition-type is ultimately the key deciding 
factor in determining how far and how expansively transitional justice can 
be pursued. 5 Many transitions end political repression but progress in this 
regard is often implicitly dependent on the pre-transition economy going 
unreformed or unpunished. 
 Because transitional justice is generally presented in very idealistic terms, 
scholars in the fi eld have begun to acknowledge that its virtuous eff ects are 
more easily presumed than proven. 6 Amongst advocates and activists in par-
ticular, one sees in the literature an emotional commitment to expanding 
transitional justice that generally eschews doubts about its overall effi  cacy. 
Mobekk ’ s warning that the  ‘ expectations of truth commissions have tended to 
be exaggerated, and their challenges minimised ’ is one that applies across the 
board in transitional justice. 7 Indeed, the underestimation of costs, exaggera-
tion of benefi ts and hyperbole in discussing pros and cons of proposals that 
blights humanitarian policy-making is particularly prevalent in transitional 
justice. 8 A fear has developed among practitioners and theorists about the 
damage to the credibility of transitional justice from exaggerated claims, and 
242 Finnish Yearbook of International Law (Vol. 23, 2012–2013)
  9.  Laurel  E. Fletcher and  Harvey  M. Weinstein ,  ‘ Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the 
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation ’ ,  24  Human Rights Quarterly ( 2002 )  573 – 639 
at 601 . 
 10.  Kieran  McEvoy ,  ‘ Beyond Legalism: Towards a Th icker Understanding of Transitional 
Justice ’ ,  34  Journal of Law and Society ( 2007 )  411 – 440 at 426 ;  Rachel  Kerr and  Eirin 
 Mobekk ,  Peace  & Justice: Seeking Accountability After War ( Polity Press:  London ,  2007 ) at 
 181 . 
 11.  Olsen, Payne and Reiter,  Transitional Justice in Balance, supra note 5, at 131. 
 12.  For example, it constituted 5% in both Guatemala and Rwanda ( Roger  Duthie ,  ‘ Intro-
duction ’ , in  Pablo  de Greiff  and  Roger  Duthie (eds),  Transitional Justice and Development: 
 Making Connections ( Social Science Research Council:  New York ,  2009 )  17 – 27 at 21 . 
 13.  Agnes  Hurwitz and  Kaysie  Studdard ,  Rule of Law Programs in Peace Operations ( Interna-
tional Peace Academy:  New York ,  2005 ) at  11 . 
 14.  Christine  Bell ,  ‘ Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the  “ Field ” or 
 “ Non-Field ” ’ ,  3  International Journal of Transitional Justice ( 2009 )  5 – 27 at 11 . 
 15.  Offi  ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,  ‘ Rule of Law 
Tools for Post-Confl ict States: Prosecution Initiatives ’ ,  < www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/Ruleofl awProsecutionsen.pdf > at 3. 
concern has long been expressed that transitional justice advocacy  ‘ claims too 
much. ’ 9 Some in the fi eld now fear the  ‘ overselling ’ 10 of transitional justice 
can encourage unrealisable public expectations of what it can achieve, ulti-
mately causing unfair assessments that the mechanisms employed have failed: 
 Governments, societies, and international actors have high expectations for tran-
sitional justice — so high, in fact, that it seems to be overloaded with goals  … 
Regardless of how comprehensive its programs, transitional justice could not pos-
sibly fulfi l all these goals. 11 
 If the increasing ambition of transitional justice ’ s goals were merely an 
academic question, there would be little cause for concern. However, its 
mechanisms must compete with ongoing peace-building processes like 
democratisation, demobilisation, development, rule of law reconstruction 
and land reform that donors also fund. Given that as much as 5% of develop-
ment aid to a country can take the form of assistance to transitional justice 
initiatives, 12 it is necessary to question the extent to which this may lessen the 
availability of funding for other social reconstruction projects. As Hurwitz 
notes,  ‘ there is often a high demand to include more activities in the peace-
building equation, yet these demands are not often met with the funding or 
national or international capacity necessary to implement the dizzying array 
or activities. ’ 13 Pressure from donors who have funded transitional justice 
thus far has forced the movement to think more critically about the claims it 
makes and the ends it pursues. 14 Indeed, the management of expectations has 
now emerged as one of transitional justice ’ s key challenges. 15 
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 Bearing this in mind, this article examines the potential for transitional 
justice to signifi cantly impact on patterns of distribution, development and 
inequality. It argues that the lack of progress in reducing inequality or pov-
erty is less the result of  ‘ ideological preoccupations ’ 16 of those administering 
justice or pursuing reconciliation and reparations than the product of doubts 
based (i) on practicality and (ii) on the law of unintended consequences. Th e 
fi rst, practical, doubts fl ow from the belief that current transitional justice 
mechanisms, alone or in combination, are unsuited professionally, organi-
sationally and conceptually to resolving issues of structural injustice. Th e 
apparent faith in the transitional justice literature that its mechanisms can or 
should operate generally as a simple mechanical lever for pursuing economic 
justice in deeply divided peace-building ecologies conspicuously lacks any 
reference to political economy literature on post-confl ict reconstruction. Th is 
vast literature examines the distribution of political authority and economic 
reward, the politics embedded in the everyday operations of economic life 
and, in transitional societies, explores how institutions and policies can be 
crafted to channel patterns of illicit accumulation in the direction of sustain-
able development and structural change. However, if one looks beyond the 
aspirational language, one gets little sense in transitional justice literature how 
corrupt authoritarian or wartime accumulation can be transformed into fruit-
ful and egalitarian structural change, how the degree to which a centralised 
bureaucratic state was degraded prior to transition impacts on the potential 
for developmental resource mobilisation, or how prospects for broad-based 
development is aff ected by GDP per capita levels. Th is new frontier in transi-
tional justice is comprised of laudable but generic aspirations for a more equi-
table society, but there are no generic transitions. Each period of dramatic 
political change in each country will endure its own idiosyncrasies and insti-
tutional legacies which must inevitably make the aspirations for a benefi cial 
structural impact of transitional justice more or less feasible. However, there 
appears to be little awareness in the literature of what the most relevant idi-
osyncrasies (e.g., duration and type of war/authoritarianism, extractive capac-
ity of state, legitimacy) might be. 17 
 Th e second, consequentialist, basis for doubt about the wider emancipatory 
potential of transitional justice stems from fear of jeopardising the transition 
by alienating those who stand to lose from fairer distribution of opportuni-
ties and wealth. On this basis, as Holmes argues, the greater attention given 
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to civil and political rights deprivations in transitional justice overall that 
is increasingly criticised is  ‘ neither impartial nor random ’ (nor, it might be 
added, biased), but determined by the exigencies of transition: 
 Th e selectivity of our attention to injustice is governed by asymmetries of political 
power. We ignore one injustice and focus on another depending on who has more 
political power or a more audible political voice. 18 
 If, as critics of the hitherto-dominant liberal-legalist view of transition so cor-
rectly point out, the causes of the initial confl ict endure beyond transition, so 
too will opposition to any amelioration of them. As Section 6 explores, the 
opposition of narrow but immensely powerful sectoral interests can stymie 
the developmental potential of transitional justice, but this essential factor of 
 transition has received far less attention in the literature than the narrowness 
of the concept of  justice . Kennedy ’ s warning that the human rights profes-
sional ’ s vocabulary  ‘ encourages an overestimation of the distinction between 
its own idealism and the hard realpolitik of those it purports to address ’ is 
particularly apt in these circumstances. 19 Even in the most benign conditions, 
changing the imperatives of a domestic economy is a protracted and confl ict-
ual process. So too, it might be said, is altering the political landscape, but 
at the time when transitional justice projects are being mooted, the fact of a 
transition from confl ict to peace and/or from authoritarianism to democratic 
rule implies some distribution of political power has already taken place, 
however superfi cially. However, after confl ict or authoritarianism, strug-
gles between the political leadership and those they replace or exclude over 
resources endure and may intensify even if the contest for political power is 
resolved. 
 Section 2 begins by recapitulating the links between socio-economic dep-
rivation and confl ict, and goes on to examine the perception in much of the 
literature that transitional justice ’ s narrow focus on civil and political rights 
abuses has marginalised issues of development and redistribution. Section 3 
examines how this critique, initially focused on the omission of the fi eld to 
address parallel exploitations, has now degenerated into a rhetorical battle 
which pitches transitional justice as an actively harmful, neo-liberal pro-
ject which calls into question the legitimacy of existing modalities of truth 
commissions, trials and reparations. Section 4 assesses the extent to which 
the marginalisation of socio-economic issues can be ascribed to ideological 
bias and the extent to which the practical limitations of traumatic  political 
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 transition provide a complementary or superior explanation. Section 5 
 analyses the practical limitations of trials, truth commissions and reparations 
in catalysing development, fostering social justice and stimulating redistribu-
tion, arguing that the historical record and the inherent potential of these 
mechanisms off ers far less scope for optimism than the rhetoric examined in 
Sections 2 and 3 would suggest. Section 6 argues that the fundamental prem-
ise underlying this rhetoric, namely that the freedom transition off ers in the 
political-democratic sphere is equal, comparable or analogous to that in the 
economic, social or cultural spheres, is fl awed. 
 To reduce the fi eld to its composite words, the article concludes by argu-
ing that there is less to be gained from questioning the  conception of justice 
in transitional justice than there is from questioning the  potential of transi-
tion . Much of the dissatisfaction with transitional justice in the literature in 
fact refl ects the shortcomings of transition and not the amalgam of theories, 
individuals and institutions that apply in context-specifi c iterations of transi-
tional justice. Applying these generalised one-aspiration-fi ts-all expectations 
to post-confl ict states like Somalia or the Ivory Coast reveals what Colvin 
describes as the na ï ve technicism of transitional justice in assuming  ‘ that 
societies can be understood and manipulated, and people behave rationally 
or at least predictably. ’ 20 Transitional justice consistently makes unrealistic 
conjectures about the malleability of social and political processes. Indeed, 
the need to separate utopian dreams from practical possibilities is seen by 
some as the most pressing challenge for the fi eld overall. 21 Increased concern 
with issues of socio-economic justice in the fi eld is welcome, necessary, and 
can highlight modest but benefi cial ways in which post-confl ict societies can 
be made more equitable. However, transitional justice ’ s greatest impact will 
generally be in the area of civil and political rights. Th ere is a danger that the 
socio-economic critique of transitional justice risks stigmatising advances in 
this area as unduly modest or even as impediments to greater reform. 
 2. Socio-Economics, Confl ict and Transition 
 It borders on the truistic to argue that poverty is deeply intertwined with the 
dynamics of both confl ict and authoritarianism. Th ough political, psycho-
logical and cultural stimuli may drive human rights abuses, they are usually 
246 Finnish Yearbook of International Law (Vol. 23, 2012–2013)
 22.  Cynthia  J. Arnson and  I.  William Zartman (eds),  Rethinking the Economic of War: Th e 
Intersection of Need, Creed and Greed ( Johns Hopkins University Press ,  2005 ) . 
 23.  Stuart  E. Eizenstat ,  John  Edward Porter and  Jeremy  M. Weinstein ,  ‘ Rebuilding Weak 
States ’ ,  84  Foreign Aff airs ( 2005 )  134 – 146 at 140 . 
 24.  Mark  Duffi  eld ,  Global Governance and the New Wars ( Zed Books:  London ,  2001 ) at  115 . 
 25.  Linda  Agerbak , cited in Rama Mani,  Beyond Retribution — Seeking Justice in the Shadows of 
War ( Polity Press:  Cambridge ,  2002 ) at  128 – 129 . 
 26.  E.g.,  Philip  Verwimp ,  ‘ An Economic Profi le of Peasant Perpetrators of Genocide: Micro-
level Evidence from Rwanda ’ ,  77  Journal of Development Economics ( 2005 )  297 – 323 . 
 27.  E.g.,  Susan  L. Woodward ,  ‘ Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowl-
edge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions ’ ,  1  Journal of Intervention and State-Building 
( 2007 )  143 – 170 ;  Lars-Erik  Cederman ,  Kristian  Skrede Gleditsch and  Halvard  Buhaug 
(eds),  Inequality, Grievances and Civil War ( Cambridge University Press ,  2013 ) . 
 28.  Paul  Collier ,  Anke  Hoeffl  er and  Dominic  Rohmer ,  ‘ Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasi-
bility and Civil War ’ ,  61  Oxford Economic Papers ( 2009 )  1 – 27 . 
 29.  Carranza,  ‘ Plunder and Pain ’ ,  supra note 16, at 312. 
conditioned by deeper socio-economic factors and pathologies of power that 
determine types of harm and who should suff er it. Poverty, inequality and 
absence of means for redress are among the primary causes of violence in con-
fl icted societies. 22 Low-income states are estimated to be 15 times more prone 
to internal confl ict than those in the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development. 23 Th e inextricable linkage of underdevelopment with 
a high risk of violent confl ict has long been a core assumption in development 
discourse. 24 Th e problem where there is an economic source to confl ict is 
often less the scarcity of resources (though this is of course contributory), but 
rather horizontal inequality between groups and the impossibility of rectify-
ing these socio-economic injustices through political channels: 
 Th e cause is not so much lack of resources, per se, as injustice: social, economic 
and political structures that maintain the dominance of an in-group at the centre 
of power over an out-group at the periphery to the extent of denying the most 
basic economic, social and political rights. 25 
 Even confl icts that are ostensibly cultural or ethnic are strongly associated 
with lower levels of economic well-being. 26 Even where inequality and pov-
erty did not cause confl ict, they may have constituted an aggravating factor 
or fl owed from the confl ict. 27 It is something of a commonplace that war can 
be a sustainable system of economic organisation. Confl ict is often driven as 
much by the opportunity for a group to enrich itself through loot or control 
of natural resources as it is by grievance. 28 Authoritarianism is even more 
lucrative. When they died, the DR Congo ’ s Mobutu Sese Seko and Indone-
sian dictator President Suharto amassed US $ 12bn and US $ 9bn respectively 
in assets, 29 while Chad ’ s Hiss è ne Habr é left offi  ce taking the national treasury 
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with him. 30 Collaborators, kin and supporters will benefi t commensurately. 
Internal confl ict or repression operates as a form of  ‘ development in reverse, ’ 31 
eviscerating the economy at a macro-level by destroying or corrupting state 
institutions, infrastructure and resources, and at a micro-level by obliterating 
employment, welfare provision (if any) and public services. 32 Even when war 
or authoritarianism ends, pre-existing inequalities can endure to structure 
the life experiences of the survivor population, while displacement, disease 
and wide availability of weaponry can exacerbate these diffi  culties. Most civic 
unrest and violence which follows ostensibly successful transitions stem from 
socio-economic grievances that catalysed or fl owed from pre-transitional 
conditions. 33 
 2.1. Th e Narrow Lens of Transitional Justice 
 Th ough the types of states dealing with post-confl ict legacies of deprivation 
and inequality are those to which transitional justice actors typically deploy, 
issues of socio-economic justice have until very recently played a marginal 
role in transitional justice, defi ned herein as  ‘ the full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society ’ s attempts to come to terms with a legacy 
of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation. ’ 34 Th e most familiar examples of transitional justice 
like trials, truth commissions and lustration have paid minimal attention to 
issues of structural inequality. Because the conception of transition was typi-
cally a limited one implying a progression from war or authoritarianism to 
liberal democracy (defi ned in its most basic forms by Teitel as  ‘ the move from 
less to more democratic regimes ’ 35 or by Smiley as one from a regime  ‘ whose 
norms are bad to one whose norms are good ’ ), 36 the conceptual and philo-
sophical dimensions of economic injustice were not deeply analysed by those 
within and outwith transitioning societies attempting to make the emergent 
peace sustainable. Th e over-riding concerns were stability, reconfi guration of 
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state institutions and popular participation in politics. While the political 
universe changed, the poverty, inequality and under-development that char-
acterised the earlier confl ict consistently persist in the new liberal democratic 
dispensation, as illustrated by a random sample of states which undertook 
transitional justice to at least some degree. Four years after the end of  apart-
heid in South Africa, 61% of blacks lived in poverty while only 1% of whites 
did. 37 Th e prime benefi ciaries of apartheid famously retired into luxury holi-
day homes, their accrued wealth untouched. 38 Today, inter-race inequality 
remains high while intra-race inequality increases dramatically. 39 Even after 
democratic transition, Brazilian and Filipino land-ownership continued to 
be dominated by large  latifundia , continuing to impoverish dependant rural 
communities. 40 Th e discredited militaries of Chile and Indonesia retained 
control of important enterprises within the state like copper mining and food 
distribution respectively, even where they lost political control. 41 Transition 
to Maoist rule in democratic Nepal did little to diminish the wealth of the 
deposed king. 42 Th ough Guatemala ’ s peace accords established an increased 
target ratio for tax-to-GDP in order provide basic services and infrastructure 
for the indigenous groups whose deprivation led to war, the landed elite resist 
tax reform of any sort. 43 
 Transitional justice appeared to concentrate on the civil-political tip of the 
iceberg and hence ignored vast structural issues beneath the waterline which 
formed the background or catalyst for the abuses it reckoned with. Its mecha-
nisms concerned themselves more with physical violence attending past civil 
and political rights violations than with past or present structural violence, 
defi ned herein as the phenomenon whereby the structure of society  manifests 
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unequal power relationships which lead to unequal life chances, harming 
people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. 44 Th e wrongs 
pursued were those gross human rights violations committed against indi-
viduals or collectivities (eg crimes against humanity, torture, murder) which 
were motivated by gaining or retaining political control, as opposed to social 
or economic abuses. 45 Likewise, the targets of transitional justice were perpe-
trators for whom criminal justice was the appropriate response, as opposed 
to benefi ciaries of a systematically unfair economy where a more distributive 
conception of justice would be more opportune. 46 Criminal trial tends to 
cast confl ict in terms of identifi able criminal acts against the victim ’ s bodily 
integrity, formalising an attitude that the confl ict was primarily about physi-
cal violence. 47 It singles out the instigators and actual perpetrators of violence 
 ‘ while leaving to broader initiatives in rule of law, humanitarian assistance, 
democracy building, and economic development the task of resuscitating a 
 “ sick society. ” ’ 48 TRCs also focused initially on a narrow range of extreme 
forms of human rights abuse, as opposed to more mundane socio-economic 
deprivations like land dispossession or ethnic/religious/gendered discrimina-
tions. Even the widely valorised Latin American and South African TRCs 
have been criticised for merely revealing a  ‘ diminished truth, ’ defi ning victim-
hood too narrowly, ignoring the political economies of repression, and, in the 
latter, eclipsing the racialised relationships between the benefi ciaries of white 
power and deprived black citizens. 49 As van der Merwe put it, transitional 
justice is thus a concept  ‘ that can be criticised as superfi cial for addressing 
only the excessive use of oppressive power or the ravages of collective violence 
rather than the basic nature of an exploitative system. ’ 50 Th ough it is argued 
the gains of transitional justice might be lost 51 or not fully realised if the 
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 structural causes of repression or confl ict are left unaddressed, 52 the fi eld ’ s con-
centration on consequences instead of structural causes was deemed to leave 
it ill-equipped to infl uence or inform any broader structural reform project. 53 
Transitional justice ’ s failure to examine the structural reasons for violence, 
amend injurious development policies or foster redistribution meant old 
grievances would inevitably morph into new ones. 54 
 Transitional justice scholarship began to acknowledge that structural 
change in the state was more important than any of its individual processes 
in assuring the success of transition. 55 Many now argue it is imperative to 
permanently integrate structural issues and socio-economic justice into the 
transitional justice architecture. Scholars now routinely argue that address-
ing mass poverty should be recognised as an object of justice 56 and that the 
mechanisms of transitional justice should be applied to transforming oppres-
sive economic arrangements that disenfranchise and exclude vulnerable and 
resentful segments of society. 57 Transitional justice would now connect with 
broader social justice projects, and in particular pursue a conception of devel-
opment oriented not around the dangers of pursuing growth simpliciter 
through economic liberalisation but rather around equitable forms of growth 
geared ultimately towards welfare, securing minimum levels of income, and 
human dignity. 58 Th e most forceful advocacy of this shift in transitional jus-
tice from a limited concept of confl ict prevention to societal metamorphosis 
is found in a widely-cited speech in 2006 by the then-UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour who argued that transitional justice 
 ‘ must ’ have the ambition of assisting the transformation of oppressed soci-
eties into free ones by exposing discriminatory practices and violations of 
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 economic, social and cultural rights before and during confl ict. 59 Th is turn in 
 transitional justice fi ts with an increased willingness in the fi eld to embraces 
holistic, integrated strategies that combine retributive, restorative and repara-
tive justice. 60 Transitional justice also embraces other disciplines such as 
peace-building and security sector reform which are increasingly conceptu-
alised by the UN and INGOs in terms of human security. 61 Since 2011 ’ s 
World Bank Development Report identifi ed a correlation between recurrent 
political violence and enduring poverty, the prevention of political violence 
has become a key goal of development assistance generally. 62 
 Th is altered focus may have fl owed from, and certainly accorded with, 
the perceptions of those whose lives international and domestic transitional 
justice actors tries to ameliorate. As victimisation was studied in greater depth 
came the realisation among scholars that it occurs on the level of gender, 
wealth and class, paving the way for a greater insistence on the indivisibility 
of rights in the literature that was not always appreciated in the hitherto 
predominant liberal-legalist paradigm. 63 Polls of survivor populations over-
whelmingly demonstrate that socio-economic concerns trump the desire for 
criminal justice or truth in transitions. For example, Corkalo  et al found that 
all communities in Bosnia deemed economic reconstruction and social justice 
more imperative than accountability. 64 In a survey of 2585 adults in Uganda 
in 2005, less than 1% believed justice was the most pressing priority after con-
fl ict, a fi gure dwarfed by the need for food (33%), education (5%) and health 
(6%). 65 In Nepal, only 3% of respondents thought punishing perpetrators 
was a priority, in contrast to compensation (24%), education (17%) and basic 
needs (16%). 66 Similar conclusions have also been drawn in the Democratic 
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Republic of the Congo 67 and in Kenya. 68 East Timor ’ s Commission for Recep-
tion, Truth and Reconciliation acknowledged violations of bodily integrity but 
went on to affi  rm that  ‘ the impact of conditions in which [the Timorese peo-
ple] lived, while often less remarked upon, was equally damaging and possibly 
more long-lasting. ’ 69 Laplante observes that widespread protests and riots in 
post-transitional Chile, South Africa and Guatemala arose from the same types 
of socio-economic grievances that underpinned earlier periods of human rights 
violations in these states. 70 A study of victims in Rwanda, Cambodia and East 
Timor demonstrated that the failure of their societies to secure their basic needs 
constituted signifi cant impediments to peace and reconciliation, notwithstand-
ing the apparent stability of the respective transitions. 71 While Latin American 
societies have been observed to tolerate violations by authoritarian regimes in 
the pursuit of public order, the revelation that the juntas and caudillos were 
corrupt (most notably the Pinochet Riggs Bank and tax fraud scandals) have 
proven far more damaging to their historical reputations than civil and politi-
cal rights abuses. 72 Black South Africans in particular perceive the benefi ciaries 
of apartheid as having escaped much-needed scrutiny. 73 As Oomen argues, 
 ‘ [e]ven if the input and output of justice mechanisms are perceived as fair, they 
will still lack legitimacy if they operate within a context of ongoing discrimina-
tion and deprivation. ’ 74 
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 81.  Suren Pillay,  ‘ Conclusion ’ , in Sriram and Pillay (eds),  Peace Versus Justice? ,  supra note 73, 
347–356 at 353. 
 2.2. Towards an Expanded Focus 
 Until recently, these complaints about transitional justice ’ s shortcomings 
and the potential for a more holistic response were merely  ‘ Sunday beliefs, ’ 
conceptions of (in)justice that commanded subjective assent without actu-
ally inducing action to bring about an improved state of aff airs. 75 Th e UN ’ s 
seminal  Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Report in 2004 acknowledged 
the need to repair the material damage of confl ict or authoritarianism, but 
neglected to outline even a basic blueprint for tackling structural roots of 
confl ict. 76 Practice on the ground off ered little by way of example. How-
ever, in the last fi ve years diff erent suggestions have emerged as to how the 
fi eld can address its past derelictions. 77 Lambourne conceives of a relatively 
wide form of  ‘ socioeconomic justice ’ divided into historical justice (compen-
sation, restitution, reparation) for past abuses and prospective distributive 
justice to minimise structural violence in future. 78 Andrieu asserts that the 
transformation of transitional justice should develop collective recognition 
procedures as the new rationale for social redistribution, 79 echoing Mani ’ s 
and Alexander ’ s earlier proposals of an explicitly distributive approach geared 
towards equity in resources and power in addition to pre-existing legal and 
rectifi catory forms of justice. 80 Pillay similarly contends that a redistributive 
approach  ‘ might enable the creation of lasting peace by addressing the mate-
rial discrepancies and psychological legacies of confl ict. ’ 81 Kalmanovitz would 
prefer transitional justice to prioritise social minima like education, nutrition, 
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education and health for the survivor population before attempting more 
corrective forms of justice. 82 Miller argues the fi eld should aspire towards 
what she calls  ‘ economic justice ’ which would address the economic roots of 
confl ict, temper economic liberalisation with redistribution and impact on 
the transitional government ’ s development plans. 83 Most ambitiously of all, 
Selim and Murithi assume transitional justice  ‘ should be about expanding 
not only the choices, but also the options and blueprint for society and indi-
viduals to improve their livelihoods and wellbeing. ’ 84 Aguirre and Pietropaoli 
contend that it should assure outcomes based on the third generation right 
to development. 85 Perhaps more modestly, Duthie argues transitional jus-
tice measures are not a development strategy but should be designed in ways 
that are  ‘ development sensitive, ’ 86 but this is an unusually circumspect vision 
of transitional justice ’ s potential eff ect on post-confl ict or post-authoritarian 
society. Th ese distributive/egalitarian/developmental approaches would 
address the causes of poverty as well as its symptoms, conceptualising justice 
as equality in addition to the traditional transitional justice preoccupation 
with liberty. 87 Th e presumption is that virtuous circles would emerge wherein 
justice, development and democracy would mutually reinforce each other. 88 
 In considering this presumption, it is imperative to note that develop-
ment discourse and literature has largely neglected to engage with transi-
tional justice,  89 though the UNDP has committed to strengthening the 
linkages between the two areas. 90 Development practitioners in the fi eld are 
frequently unaware or uninterested in parallel transitional justice activities, a 
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 phenomenon that refl ects less the professional balkanisation that attends all 
peace-building than a belief that the mechanisms and insights of transitional 
justice are of limited application in conjuring a sustainable socio-economic 
agenda into being. If the international development community largely dis-
counts transitional justice as being of anything more than tangential impor-
tance and if the record for transitional justice in addressing the structural roots 
of confl ict by this point is negligible, why are there such large expectations? 
Th e novelty of focus may provide one explanation. Another answer may lie in 
the traditional optimism of scholars in the fi eld regarding the potency of tran-
sition to redefi ne the norms on which a confl ict-ridden society is based. Th e 
presumption of many is that periods of transition are times when  ‘ everything 
is up for grabs all at once. ’ 91 Aguirre and Pietropaoli, for example, assert that 
transitions are rare periods of rupture  ‘ that off er opportunities to reconceive 
the social meaning of past confl icts in an attempt to reconstruct their pre-
sent and future eff ects, ’ 92 while Bergsmo  et al see transition as a transforma-
tive constitutional moment where the distribution of poverty and wealth, 
land reform and the economy may be publicly addressed. 93 It is suggested 
that truth commissions may have greater purchase because they take place 
in times when signifi cant decisions about the future course of the state will 
be adopted. 94 It is assumed that states should feel a greater compulsion to 
redress conditions of socio-economic deprivation in the transitional period, 
especially if they are presented as rights violations. 95 Arbour ’ s optimism is 
explained by her faith that  ‘ [s]ocieties in transition present unique opportu-
nities for countries to equip themselves appropriately to ensure respect for 
human rights and human dignity. ’ 96 Even the very narrow criminal remits 
of the ICC ’ s interventions in Africa have been viewed as  ‘ windows of oppor-
tunity ’ for restructuring the state and reducing poverty (albeit without any 
concrete proposals for how it should do so). 97 Given that development actors 
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also generally use periods of political change to foster systemic changes in the 
structure of society, transition may appear an unusually propitious time for 
ambitious projects. 98 Th is faith is shared to varying degrees by some devel-
opment actors, 99 anti-corruption theorists 100 and political economists who 
argue that egalitarian structural change is most feasible where antagonistic 
interest groups have temporarily or permanently lost power. 101 
 Of course, critics of the emancipatory rhetoric of human rights have argued 
that humanitarians make arguments  ‘ they know to be less persuasive than they 
claim ’ when activists and advocates attempt to revamp its tools (like transi-
tional justice) to correct critical shortcomings (like a perceived narrowness of 
focus). 102 Notwithstanding the ostensibly immense confi dence scholars have 
in transitional justice, even optimistic works are studiously opaque about 
what their conceptions of distributive, developmental or socio-economic 
justice will ultimately look like on the ground. Elements of a broad-based, 
development-friendly recovery like infl ation policy, currency reform, bank 
regulation and even taxation go unaddressed in the literature. Advocates of a 
role for transitional justice in fundamentally altering the structures of divided 
societies acknowledge that thus far all we have are a series of hypothetical con-
nections to be further researched, ’ 103 points of possible interconnection, ’ 104 
 ‘ a starting point for a broader conversation ’ 105 and underdeveloped concepts 
and boundaries. 106 Suggested activities ( ‘ exposing ’ discriminatory practices, 107 
 ‘ reaching ’ for deeper justice, 108  ‘ making connections ’ ) 109 exist in the realm of 
the exhortatory, at some causal remove from concrete betterment of peoples ’ 
lives. Th ough these developments in transitional justice ostensibly represent 
a welcome change from the traditional humanitarian  reluctance identifi ed 
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by Kennedy to make distributional choices, current advocacy is still slow to 
identify winners and losers, how much the winners stand to benefi t, or how 
the losers might react. 110 Th e apparent progress in redefi ning transitional jus-
tice, therefore, is more rhetorical than programmatic or policy-based. Because 
these exhortations have yet to be acted upon, there is no established theo-
retical or empirical base on which to build. 111 Even a rudimentary  ‘ lessons 
learned ’ stage that could serve as a generic template for activities to this end 
has yet to be arrived at. Th e generalised arguments made are inspiring but 
lacking in even the most minimal concrete detail if considered in the context 
of particularised transitions. 
 3. Transitional Justice and Rhetoric 
 If the potential of transitional justice to transform social and economic organ-
isation of the state is as self-evident as its proponents suggest, the question 
remains as to why socio-economic justice has been pursued so infrequently in 
times of signifi cant political change. In answering this question, the answer is 
found to lie not with the inadequacy of trials, truth commissions or repara-
tions as catalysts for macro-economic reforms, nor the often painfully nego-
tiated nature of transition, but in the conception of justice within the fi eld. 
Arguments to the eff ect that more egalitarian social change is impaired by 
the narrowness of the concept of justice presuppose a wide latitude for tran-
sitional justice actors to defi ne their fi elds of action and a high degree of 
effi  cacy once they act. 
 3.1.  Transitional Justice as the Marginaliser of 
Socio-Economic Injustice  
 Aside from the startlingly ambitious nature of the propositions made about 
transitional justice ’ s potential to thoroughly transform unjust arrangements 
in a manner that war, democracy, development and aid have not, what is 
most notable about this line of argumentation is the fi rmness with which 
it rejects transitional justice ’ s existing modes of practice. As noted above, all 
arguments asserting a hitherto-unrealised distributive/developmental potency 
in transitional justice begin by deprecating the narrowness of the existing 
conception of justice. Th is narrowness is viewed as an inevitable consequence 
of the liberal paradigm which dominates the fi eld, elevating legalism and 
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political rights at the expense of including economic and cultural issues. 112 
Th e  paradigmatic example of this is the South African TRC ’ s very limited 
defi nition of a gross violation of human rights as  ‘ (a) the killing, abduction, 
torture or severe ill-treatment of any person; or (b) any attempt, conspir-
acy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit [killing, 
abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment] ’ in a state where hunger and dep-
rivation arguably were responsible for far greater losses of life. 113 Torture, war 
crimes and rape committed by police, soldiers or politicians fall comfortably 
within the conceptual parameters of transitional justice, but income fl ows 
and inequalities they made possible for the much larger number of corpo-
rations, landowners and other benefi ciaries do not. Socio-economic rights 
have historically been marginalised in scholarship and policy-making since 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Transitional justice is therefore 
seen by some as yet another skirmish in a wider ideological battle over human 
rights. On this view, the failure to integrate structural violence perspectives is 
seen as the product of the following traditional liberal-legalist assumptions in 
the wider human rights literature: 
 1. that the transitioning government ’ s obligations to positively secure eco-
nomic rights will inevitably fall foul of the state ’ s lack of resources, capac-
ity or agency, and therefore should not be pursued; 114 or 
 2. that deprivations of economic, social or cultural rights are less egregious 
than violations of civil and political rights, 115 or 
 3. that socio-economic rights violations are non-justiciable and therefore 
better addressed by development actors. 116 
 Overall, as Arbour puts it,  ‘ not actively protecting and promoting economic, 
social, and cultural rights refl ects the hidden assumption that ESC rights are 
not entitlements but aspirational expectations ’ in transitional justice. 117 
 Th e modern critique of transitional justice takes Arbour ’ s position further 
by arguing that it applies with greater force in transition than in ordinary 
conditions of political stability, for two reasons. Th e fi rst is that transitional 
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justice ’ s traditional preoccupation with a rupture between the repressive/ 
confl icted past obscures the ongoing nature of past structural violence. 118 In 
this way, the predominant concern of transitional justice with the cessation of 
military or repressive violence and handover of power has marginalised ques-
tions of socio-economic development. 119 Th e second reason is that the tele-
ological impetus of transitional justice towards a peaceful democratic future 
depoliticises debate over social structures by assuming all fundamental dilem-
mas are either resolved by the sheer fact of liberalising transition or resolvable 
soon within the new democratic dispensation. 120 It is alleged that progress 
is stymied by the fi eld ’ s building-blocks approach in which justice mediates 
political transition and only then can larger problems be addressed by the 
polity or the market. 121 As Arthur puts it 
 Instead of  ‘ coming to terms ’ with historical complexities (as one might expect in an 
eff ort to deal with  ‘ the past ’ ), transitional justice was presented as deeply enmeshed 
with political problems that were legal-institutional and, relatively, short-term in 
nature. So short-term, in fact, that they could be dealt with specifi cally during a 
 ‘ transitional ’ period. 122 
 Th e position that transitional justice has ignored wider issues of social jus-
tice is inarguable. What is notable, and indeed regrettable, about these argu-
ments is the dramatic ratcheting-up of the surrounding rhetoric to the eff ect 
that transitional justice as currently constituted in practice or conceptualised 
in theory is worthless, pointless or merely counter-productive if it does not 
address poverty or social exclusion. It is one thing to argue, as Mamdani does, 
that social justice is more important in some or all transitions than traditional 
modalities of transitional justice like trial, 123 or that the narrow mainstream 
practice of transitional justice reinforces a narrative that the confl ict was polit-
ical or ethnic but unrelated to deeper economic inequalities. 124 Few would 
dispute the assertion that transitional justice is essentially incomplete without 
attention to wider injustices. As Dwyer put it,  ‘ How much reconciliation can 
be achieved if, in post-apartheid South Africa, Whites admit that their eco-
nomic, social and political status was based on a morally bankrupt system but 
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then refuse to accept sharply redistributive taxation? ’ 125 Th ese are valid, some 
might say unavoidable, criticisms of transitional justice as currently practiced. 
It is also reasonable to suggest transitional justice may seem an empty gesture 
to those victims who benefi t only indirectly from democratisation and estab-
lishing the rule of law or to those whose children and grandchildren will be 
the ultimate inheritors of any long-term transitional dividend. 126 
 3.2.  Transitional Justice as an Aggravator of 
Socio-Economic Injustice 
 However, there is another, more antagonistic strain to this position that sig-
nifi cantly ups the rhetorical ante, going beyond merely cataloguing the regret-
table omissions of the fi eld to argue transitional justice as currently practiced 
is actively harmful in socio-economic terms. Th e most prevalent example is a 
zero-sum game argument already familiar in wider human rights debates to the 
eff ect that pursuing civil and political rights represents an acquiescence to the 
dominant neo-liberal economic order and an implicit renunciation of social 
justice issues like health, welfare and poverty. For example, Miller argues that 
the standard set of debates on transitional justice (truth versus justice, what 
works, etc.) have erected an artifi cial binary separation between the realms of 
economics and justice, a deliberate  ‘ constructed invisibility ’ that consciously 
or unconsciously fosters an aggressively liberalising post-transition politics. 127 
Carranza similarly argues that the fi eld deliberately  ‘ looks away ’ when it sees 
socio-economic injustices. 128 Teitel vaguely suggests that transitional justice 
 ‘ has, in large part, displaced broader reform projects, and appears to represent 
a move away from progressive politics ’ without suggesting what those broader 
reform projects might be. 129 Wilson is more direct in contending that the 
South African TRC ’ s narrow focus on extreme violence  ‘ actually obstructed ’ 
a wider search for social justice there. 130 On this view, transitional justice 
appears a deliberate mechanism for ideological obfuscation to divert atten-
tion from the economic benefi ciaries of the predecessor regime. 131 Mullen 
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is somewhat more generous when he accepts that widespread labour abuses 
and private sector exploitation in El Salvador  ‘ are not entirely attributable ’ 
to the mandate of its Commission on Truth, which again focused more on 
individuals than broader systems. 132 Th ough rhetorically compelling, these 
arguments appear to confl ate a failed operation (transitional justice) with the 
pre-existing disease (inequality). Th e best example of this tendency towards 
hyperbole is Miller ’ s assertion that by ignoring the deeper roots of confl ict, 
transitional justice mechanisms in explicitly causal terms  “ may actively con-
tribute to new outbreaks of violence. ’ 133 Th e extension of this argument, that 
ignoring inequalities will inevitably lead to a recurrence of confl ict, 134 appears 
to ignore the plethora of transitions in states like Mozambique, Angola, 
Guatemala and Sierra Leone which appear highly durable notwithstanding 
the absence of any real distributive justice. 135 
 Others go further rhetorically to argue that transitional justice as currently 
practiced is eff ectively the handmaiden of neo-liberal structural adjustment 
programs. Certainly, economic liberalisation tends to accompany political 
transition, though few states will be untouched by it beforehand — it may 
after all have been a contributory factor to war or authoritarian rule. Numer-
ous scholars argue that transitional justice must be understood as an integral 
part of the liberal peace-building model and therefore automatically promotes 
neo-liberal market-based economic models antithetical to redistribution of 
wealth or economic equality. 136 Makau Wa Mutua, for example, sees tran-
sitional justice as reproducing the assumption in global human rights of the 
naturalness of the market and the inevitability of capitalist relationships. 137 
Nagy contends that transitional justice is open to the accusation of attempt-
ing to  ‘ produce subjects and truths that align with market democracy and are 
blind to gender and social justice. ’ 138 Gready contends that by privileging 
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civil and political violations over economic abuses in the South African TRC, 
the  ‘ result has been entrenched, even increasing, inequality. ’ 139 On the basis 
of these arguments, transitional justice isn ’ t merely failing to address socio-
economic justice, it appears to exacerbate it by serving to protect the interests 
of the privileged at the expense of the poor, 140 actively perpetuating the posi-
tion of existing economic elites instead of empowering the marginalised, 141 
and serving as an enabling context for the ravages of the free market. 142 Lost 
amongst the stridency of these claims is the fact that these are essentially 
arguments from omission and temporal correlation. Because transitional jus-
tice has not addressed socio-economic justice and is located within broader 
trends of peace-building and democratisation that exacerbate or at least fail to 
mitigate socio-economic inequalities, it is argued that the fi eld must therefore 
automatically support or conduce to marketisation and liberalising growth. 
 Ignatieff  is convincing in arguing against this mechanical confl ation of free 
market globalists and human rights internationalists. Th ough the moral indi-
vidualism that traditionally characterises human rights and its transitional 
justice variant has some  ‘ elective affi  nity with the economic individualism 
of the global market ’ , the two cannot be presumed to march hand in hand 
as the relationship between the two is more usually antagonistic. 143 Because 
humanitarians presume institutions like transitional justice are inherently 
benign and eff ective, when they fail to realise their assumed potential claims 
tend to arise that policy-making has been  ‘ captured, ’ distorted or misused. 144 
In this case, transitional justice is assumed to have been commandeered by 
agents sympathetic to, or actively supportive of, globalising capital. However, 
as Section 4 goes on to argue, it is diffi  cult to fi nd any scholars or activists 
or policy-makers in the fi eld supportive of neo-liberal economics or the idea 
that transitional justice should facilitate capitalism. Even if transitional justice 
does not act as a brake on simultaneous processes of economic liberalisation, 
it cannot be assumed to facilitate these processes. It may be entirely neutral. 
Th e prosecutor exploring the role of blood diamonds in the Sierra Leone 
confl ict or the truth commissioner listening to rape testimony in Guatemala 
would be astonished to discover their work provided an  ‘ enabling context for 
free markets ’ 145 purely because the scope of their enquiry didn ’ t expand as far 
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as the roots of all social division. Advocates of a wider role for  transitional 
justice must remain alive to the possibility that neither a  ‘ conspiracy of inter-
ests ’ nor a  ‘ coherence of blindness ’ explain its lack of impact on unjust societal 
structures. 146 
 A few other less common rhetorical strategies have been employed to criti-
cise existing modalities of transitional justice. Th e fi rst is the dramatic re-
orientation of the metrics by which transitional justice should be judged. For 
example Villa-Vicencio contended the South Africa TRC should be judged 
not on the basis of who went to prison but on whether the quality of everyday 
life was better, 147 while Alexander argues that transitional justice was  ‘ critical ’ 
and  ‘ vital ’ to poverty reduction (before somewhat contradictorily noting it 
rarely has this role). 148 Another line of argument is that transitional justice, 
with its focal points of retribution and restoration, is pointless if it doesn ’ t 
make everyday life better or reduce poverty. Th e argument of Boraine, on the 
one hand, and Selim and Murithi, on the other, that reconciliation without 
economic justice  ‘ is cheap and spurious ’ , or merely symbolic, is implicitly 
or explicitly commended in much of the literature. 149 Another rhetorical 
strategy is to juxtapose transitional justice with other projects. Mani ’ s posi-
tion that transitional justice represents a costly luxury in a highly-constrained 
environment is reasonable, but she too appears to accept the zero-sum game 
interpretation when she further asserts that transitional justice  ‘ often comes 
to represent a trade-off  of sorts between justice or development. ’ 150 Th ough 
there is a legitimate concern that costly transitional justice projects are pitched 
fi nancially against justice sector reform activities, 151 neither Mani nor anyone 
else manages to cite specifi c examples of money being diverted from devel-
opment projects to transitional justice. Funding for transitional justice and 
development tend to come from diff erent sources, while fi nancial support for 
development dwarfs that of transitional justice. 152 
 Th e trend in transitional justice scholarship towards addressing structural, 
socio-economic issues is welcome, and the critique of the limitations of its 
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existing modalities is a welcome antidote to the exaggerated claims that it 
forms the centre-piece of social repair. 153 It becomes counter-productive, 
however, when the existing valuable work trials, truth commissions and repa-
rations programs do is devalued in the strident demands for a re-orientation 
of the fi eld. If, as has been suggested, transitional justice, as a whole, risks 
losing credibility unless it improves overall living conditions for citizens in 
the transitional state, the fi eld itself might be in danger. 154 In driving the 
fi eld from non-existence to peace-building mainstream in less than two dec-
ades, transitional justice scholars formulate the issues, but also defi ne how 
those issues are resolved, using their moral appeal, investigative missions and 
national NGO partners to pressure states to comply with their conceptions 
of how justice should be pursued. 155 Historically, ideas outlined in papers, 
conferences or the fi eld about how transitional justice can be practiced often 
amount to self-fulfi lling prophecies of what will be done in future, even if 
the success anticipated does not follow as inevitably. Kritz exaggerates only 
slightly when he contends that a government ’ s transitional justice policy 
 ‘ often depends less on well-grounded and proven policy considerations than 
on whether the junior member of staff  writing the policy memo has some 
experience with the South African TRC or another transitional justice pro-
cess, ’ 156 but he highlights the very salient fact that how scholars, advocates 
and practitioners think about and experience transitional justice can have a 
large impact on how it is practiced and its relationship to other socio-political 
phenomena. Th e parameters of transitional justice are often defi ned by what 
international donors at supranational, bilateral or INGO levels are willing 
to pay. 157 If mere accountability, or truth, or purges or lustration are held 
to be worthless by those within the fi eld, then external support from donors 
and peace-builders may be jeopardised. Some rather large babies risk being 
thrown out with the bathwater if this perception that transitional justice as 
currently constituted unduly narrows the potential for thoroughgoing social 
transformation becomes an article of faith. It is worth therefore considering 
whether transitional justice has these wider, egalitarian and developmental 
potentials, both in terms of the mechanisms employed and the context in 
which they are used. 
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 4.  Th e Circumspection of Transitional Justice: 
Pragmatism or Ideology? 
 Th e foregoing criticisms of transitional justice have proceeded on the basis 
that the fi eld has resisted claims for structural justice because its liberal-
legalist framework and (unspoken) sympathy for market economics denies 
the legitimacy of these aims 158 or because transitional justice actors fear the 
dilution of the fi eld ’ s purposes. 159 However, while it is clear that the tradi-
tional debates on stability, truth and criminal justice have operated to over-
shadow the importance of economic factors in transition, it is questionable 
the extent to which this trend can be explained by any acceptance of the 
rightness of the neoliberal free market paradigm. On the basis of a survey of 
writings on transitional justice since the late 1980s, it is hard to discern any 
theorist in the fi eld explicitly or implicitly arguing in favour of neo-liberal 
capitalist economics. It is signifi cant that none of the writers mentioned ear-
lier who disdain the liberal-legalist limitations of the conception of justice 
in transition can cite any scholars in the fi eld who do so. For over a decade, 
mainstream transitional scholars have willingly accepted that reconstructing 
the socio-economic bases of society can exert a greater benefi cial impact than 
accountability or truth without attracting principled dissent. 160 Even the 
architects of the now-maligned South Africa TRC fully accepted at the time 
that the reversal of apartheid economic policies was more important than 
seeing PW Botha behind bars, but regretted that the need to avoid alienat-
ing right-wing elements who could prevent the transition to democratic rule 
made this impossible. 161 Th ough the UN  Transitional Justice and the Rule 
of Law Report (2004) neglected economic injustice, the UN Offi  ce of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights ’ infl uential  Rule of Law Tools series 
subsequently acknowledged that structural violence can have even more del-
eterious eff ects for the public than civil and political rights violations 162 and 
recommended that transitional justice mechanisms address it. 163 Numerous 
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truth commissions, the indictments in the Charles Taylor and Darfur trials, 
and the aforementioned polling of survivor communities constantly empha-
sise the inter-relation of bodily integrity abuses and economic injustice. Far 
from constituting a marginal position, the thesis that economic policies in 
authoritarianism and war are more permanent and damaging than civil and 
political abuses is something of an article of faith in transitional justice. No 
signifi cant dissent is to be found in the literature on the universality of eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, on the one hand, or the indivisibility of all 
three generation of rights, on the other. Few would quibble with the assertion 
that traditionally parsimonious views of transitional justice risk limiting its 
potential, even if estimations of that potential exist on a wide spectrum from 
minimalist to utopian. 
 None of this should be surprising. Transitional justice invariably rallies 
 ‘ reformist forces ’ and progressist elements that might be expected to sup-
port socio-economic justice. 164 As this section goes on to examine, the very 
few scholars who explicitly oppose a role for transitional justice in directly 
addressing socio-economic wrongs do so not on the basis of opposition to 
economic justice, development or redistribution, but on the basis that the 
available mechanisms of transitional justice are unsuited to doing so. What 
one instead sees in traditional transitional justice discourse is a concentration 
on how transitional justice can facilitate progress towards a liberal agenda of 
electoral politics, the rule of law, responsive governance and constitutional-
ism which opens the political space, essentially demonstrating ambivalence 
about the economic order. Transitional justice aspires towards a stable society, 
but not necessarily a capitalist one. Transitional justice is certainly guilty of 
under-analysing its potential in stimulating socio-economic reform, a matter 
which is slowly being redressed. However, under-analysis of the potential to 
catalyse socio-economic reform should not be confused with opposition to it. 
Much of the rhetoric surrounding transitional justice and structural injustice 
takes place on the basis of an unhelpful  ‘ those who are not with us are against 
us ’ view of the fi eld. 
 If policy-makers in transitional justice hold development or redistribu-
tion as legitimate aims in peace-building generally, then the palpable lack of 
enthusiasm for a developmental or redistributive role for transitional justice 
is better explained by the yawning gap between the ends proposed and the 
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means available than any ideological bias. As Cobi á n and Reategui put it, any 
signifi cant developmental or redistributive project 
 operates in the arena of massive and anonymous policies directed to whole catego-
ries of the population and is aimed at designing a general institutional framework, 
[while] transitional justice usually takes as its starting point the domain of the 
particular and the concrete: bringing justice to bear in relation to serious human 
rights violations suff ered by specifi c individuals. 165 
 By comparison to what critics of transitional justice argue it  should pursue, 
the fi nite, targeted, traditional ambitions of the fi eld of some truth and some 
accountability thus far appear mere micro-projects unsuited to grappling with 
widespread patterns of abuse, astronomical numbers of victims and complex 
consequences. Of course, one can argue that transitional justice can and must 
expand beyond this narrow remit, but the required change is not simply a 
technocratic expansion of institutions. Transitional justice needs new concep-
tual and philosophical foundations beyond the negative self-critique exam-
ined thus far or the largely unelaborated pleas for distributive, developmental 
or socio-economic justice. On the terms of the existing self-critique of transi-
tional justice and in the absence of even the most rudimentary overall policy 
framework, the fi eld must outline solutions based on diff erent combinations 
of public and private legal norms (affi  rmative action, expropriation, taxation 
policy, investment, (de)nationalisation) to the most fundamental questions 
of distribution of wealth, allocation of capital, control of production and 
standard of living, as well as other practical-philosophical problems like how 
far back to address root problems or whether the new government can be held 
responsible for all or some of the depredations of the regime they removed. 
All of this must take place at a time when the state is rebuilding its consti-
tutional institutions, creating a functioning civil service, imposing civilian 
control over the military and stabilising a currency, to name but a few of the 
vast plethora of state-building activities, all of which make acute economic 
demands. In addition, existing post-confl ict or post-authoritarian institutions 
are dysfunctional or corrupted. Transitional justice typically occurs in what 
de Greiff  labels  ‘ very imperfect worlds. ’ By this, he means a society charac-
terised not just by the massive and systematic violation of norms, but by 
the fact that there are enormous disadvantages implicated in any attempt to 
enforce compliance. 166 Finally, these societies must grapple with the paradox 
of transitional justice that the states with the greatest need for economically 
transformative justice will often be those with the fewest available resources. 
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 Given the dearth of concrete proposals from those who urge a more expan-
sive role for transitional justice and the complexities of the post-confl ict 
or post-authoritarian ecology, it is not that surprising that even those who 
acknowledge the shortcomings of the fi eld are less than sanguine about its 
practical possibilities. Discussions about the relationship of transitional jus-
tice to wider reform need to acknowledge in practical terms  ‘ the weakness 
of agency, actors, and organisational forms that could bring about profound 
change. ’ 167 Th ough enjoying a highly visible public profi le and a degree of 
legal and/or moral authority, truth commissioners, like those who administer 
lustration or reparation schemes, merely constitute a corps of temporary pub-
lic servants. 168 Transitional justice mechanisms are generally interdisciplinary 
and well-equipped to draw attention to injustices, to defi ne the discourse of 
violation and perhaps to propose general outlines for reform. However, this 
is something quite far removed from the inherently confl ictive and highly 
technical expert processes by which proposals are budgeted, designed and 
implemented. Th e apparent timidity of transitional justice is less the product 
of ideological bias than the commonly observed preferences within the fi eld 
for clearly defi ned, mutually coherent and projectisable objectives. 169 With 
the exception of prosecutorial initiatives, transitional justice institutions are 
traditionally more reliant on the mobilisation of shame than on any enforce-
ment capability they might possess. Th is circumspection better explains the 
perceived failure of the fi eld to expand than an unspoken desire to obscure 
confl ict ’ s economic or resource-based origins. 170 
 Much like  ‘ a comprehensive anticorruption strategy ends up looking like a 
comprehensive peacebuilding or state-building strategy, ’ 171 the most aspira-
tional claims sketched in Section 3 resemble something of a Borgesian map of 
desired outcomes so multi-dimensional that they reproduce the entire scope 
of peace-building in one-to-one facsimile. To take but one example, the forms 
of reparation usually proposed (ranging from employment and property 
guarantees to compensation and guarantees of non-repetition)  ‘ could easily 
be read as the stuff  of modern governance in its entirety, rather than as a spe-
cial case of the requirements of governance in transitional societies. ’ 172 Th e 
UN Offi  cer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights accepts that pov-
erty, homelessness, education policy failures and other social ills are critically 
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important subjects, but argues that incorporating them within the scope of 
transitional justice could risk expanding the mandate of a truth  commission 
so broadly that it may be impossible to reasonably complete its tasks. 173 Even 
transitional justice scholars on the more expansive wing of the discipline like 
Roht-Arriaza warn that  ‘ broadening the scope of what we mean by transi-
tional justice to encompass the building of a just as well as peaceful society 
may make the eff ort so broad as to become meaningless. ’ 174 Building peace 
and building social justice should be inseparable processes, 175 but it does not 
necessarily follow that the institutions that work towards these ends must 
be inseparable also. In recognising the complementarity between develop-
ment and transitional justice, the need to respect the integrity of the two 
fi elds is forgotten in much of the more optimistic scholarship. 176 Much of 
the foregoing has assumed that transitional justice mechanisms can formulate 
comprehensive strategies for a fairer society, but practitioners on the ground 
traditionally defer upwards to the state and downwards to smaller units that 
supply the want of expertise or on-the-ground knowledge that transitional 
justice mechanisms typically manifest. 
 To begin with the former, it is clear the even the weak apparatus of the 
transitioning state has far greater functionality and reach than any transitional 
justice mechanism alone or in combination. Th is is all the more so when 
intrusive peace-building missions like UNTAET or UNAMSIL or UNMIK 
are on the ground. Th ough Miller regrets that  ‘ [b]y leaving economic devel-
opment, issues of resource distribution or inequality of power or wealth to 
separate courts or to executive control, transitional justice institutions implic-
itly tell society that development and confl ict may be separated in a fair fash-
ion, ’ 177 in the radically imperfect conditions of transition, a division of labour 
may actually be welcome. 178 Th e areas of economic injustice that the litera-
ture points to as key to a revitalised transitional justice are really all sectors of 
governance; as such they are inextricably interdependent. Practitioners appre-
ciate that transitional justice is not necessarily the most conducive to taking 
into account the complexities of such governance. Adequate recompense for 
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lost employment opportunities, forced displacements or resource deprivation 
would tie up entire national budgets for years to come of governments. 179 
Transitional justice bodies on the ground are far less bullish about their pros-
pects than external critics of transitional justice. For example, Peru ’ s Integral 
Reparations Plan Group ( Grupo sobre el Plan Integral de Reparaciones -GPIR) 
was at great pains to delimit their work from the macro-economic role of the 
state: 
 [Th e] PIR does not seek to resolve poverty, exclusion and inequality, which have a 
structural character and respond to the overall functioning of a political and eco-
nomic system. While some of its programs can and should contribute to improv-
ing the quality of life of victims and their families, its central objective is reparation 
and recognition of the victims as human beings, whose fundamental rights have 
been violated. Th is does not mean that the State should not also carry out a policy 
of social development aimed at attacking the roots of poverty and inequality, and 
the TRC provides, in other parts of this Report, concrete proposals of necessary 
institutional reforms, but the PIR has another purpose. 180 
 Peace agreements, constitutions and programs for government could reach 
many of the same conclusions as a truth commission in a much faster time, 
with greater enforcement power and arguably with far greater democratic 
legitimacy. Indeed, Waldorf argues that because of the sensitivity of local 
political factors and the need for some form of democratic accountability, a 
short-term intervention like transitional justice is less apt to address structural 
injustice than whatever state structures emerge in the longer-term. 181 Beyond 
this, some dilemmas like the movement of capital and goods in globalised 
markets or confl icting private demands in the black economy, labour and 
production lie largely beyond the grasp of even highly functional states, let 
alone temporary bodies in dysfunctional ones. 
 Th e standard institutions of transitional justice also rely on smaller units 
to remedy the lack of capacity they typically manifest. Th e best-funded 
truth commission ever was that in South Africa, which nevertheless needed 
1888 days to process requests for amnesty, and only published its report 
fi ve years after ending hearings. Giving additional tasks to truth commis-
sions will severely test already-strained competencies. Th e Liberian Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission acknowledged it could provide only lim-
ited recommendations to remedy issues over land tenure and redistribution, 
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and so proposed a specifi c land commission to review the complexities of 
the land tenure system, which commenced work in 2010. 182 Tunisia hived 
off  the anti-corruption remit from its commissions on human rights abuses 
and political reforms, 183 as did Bangladesh and Ghana. 184 South Africa and 
Rwanda similarly devolved issues of land to bodies other than their main 
transitional justice institutions. One can of course argue that it is regrettable 
that the truth commission and, to a lesser extent, trials in both countries 
could not infl uence the procedures of these land commissions on the basis 
that they might generate lessons about the use and abuse of land, 185 but this 
does remind us that transitional justice mechanisms operate best in terms of 
exercising infl uence (the mobilisation of shame) than defi ning policy (which 
needs both wide-ranging expertise, enforcement capacity and democratic 
legitimacy). Reasonable qualms about the adaptability of transitional justice 
mechanisms to the universe of post-confl ict injustice are a more convincing 
explanation for their perceived under-performance in relation to economic 
justice than fears about their dilution or neo-liberal capture. 
 5. Th e Limitations of  Transitional Justice Institutions 
 Scholars like Duthie or Hecht and Michalowski have suggested that the rela-
tive neglect of economic justice might owe to the complex nature of socio-
economic rights and the various interlinked causes for their deprivation 
which the mechanisms of transitional justice might not be able to reckon 
with adequately on account of their limited resources, skills, size or capac-
ity. 186 Certainly, it is easier for transitional justice to deal with civil and 
political abuses like torture or a murder in terms of identifying a violator 
(the physical perpetrator and the government/military fi gure who gave the 
order), the violated person(s) and a remedy (criminal punishment, guarantee 
of non-repetition by the democratising state) than it is diagnose the reasons 
for, and ways to rectify, the unequal macro-level economic organisation of 
society. 187 However, examples like the bills of rights in South Africa, Nepal 
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and India demonstrate that socio-economic rights can be enforceable by law, 
while truth commissions in the likes of Sierra Leone, Liberia and South Africa 
have wrestled credibly (if not entirely successfully) with structural causes of 
confl ict. 
 On similarly practical lines, Addison 188 and Elster 189 suggest that the 
dearth of resources available to transitional justice limit its distributive impact, 
while Waldorf argues the short life-spans of transitional justice mechanisms 
undermine their potential. 190 Th ese organisational explanations are also 
unconvincing — if transitional justice could deliver on even a fraction of the 
promise advocates hold out for it in redressing socio-economic wrongs, any 
resource impediments could surely be overcome by international aid, while 
the case for extending, or even making permanent, mechanisms so obviously 
benefi cial would be inarguable. Th e Limburg Principles that guide interpreta-
tion of the ICESCR accept the progressive realisation of rights over time and 
over the course of evolving national economic strength. 191 An extended time-
frame for transitional justice would fi t comfortably within the progressive 
realisation paradigm if states and donors were convinced of its developmental 
merit. Th e suggestion that expansive views of transitional justice are vague 
or utopian is also unconvincing. 192 Th e traditional aspirations of transitional 
justice have always existed on a spectrum of the immediately realisable (identi-
fying those responsible for abuses, punishing them) to the nebulous (reconcili-
ation at all levels of society) and quixotic (preventing all human rights abuses). 
 Th e most reasonable qualms over adaptability of transitional justice to 
issues of socio-economic justice are made clear on an examination of the 
three most commonly-used institutions, namely trials, truth commissions 
and reparation, in ascending order of assumed potential. 
 5.1. Trials 
 Th e litany of economic crimes that take place in the course of authoritar-
ian rule is wearily familiar — corruption, tax evasion, customs evasion, fraud, 
misappropriation of public funds and exploitation of illegal or migrant 
labour. In situations of military confl ict, war crimes like appropriation of 
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property, pillage and starvation can be added. 193 Th ey are as much a part of 
an  indivisible system of crimes on the part of the government or non-state 
grouping as torture and persecution. Th e clandestine nature of many of these 
activities is usually a refl ection of their illegality, and most will be justiciable 
as crimes. Criminal trial remains the most familiar and most symbolically 
potent avenue for transitional accountability. As noted earlier, trials for eco-
nomic abuses have sometimes proven far more damaging to reputations than 
those for civil and political rights abuses. Notable examples include the Pino-
chet tax fraud proceedings in Chile and the trials of Todor Zhivkov (Bulgaria) 
and Ramiz Alia (Albania) for embezzlement, 194 while Argentina ’ s prosecutors 
probed the junta ’ s liability for property theft. 195 Tunisia and Egypt priori-
tised the prosecution of Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak for embezzlement 
in the aftermath of the Arab spring over crimes relating to physical abuse. 
However, these represent the exception rather than the rule — it is clear that 
transitional criminal accountability has more often ignored economic crimes 
on account of its primary concern with bodily integrity abuses. 196 Scholars 
now argue that criminal tribunals should approach economic crimes the way 
they undertake civil and political trials in the expectation that this can aid 
recovery of assets amassed by perpetrators and disclose information about the 
economic practices of the regime. 197 However, while trial can be successful in 
punishing economic malfeasance, it has much greater limitations in terms of 
the pedagogical or discursive role usually claimed for criminal prosecutions. 
Th ough economic crime is the product of social, economic and political fac-
tors, the individualist model of accountability in trial invariably struggles to 
expose or condemn wider patterns of conduct or structural conditions under-
lying the crime. 198 Furthermore, even where a conviction is secured, recovery 
is extremely diffi  cult given the porosity of international fi nancial borders and 
the trans-boundary activities of transnational corporations. 
 International criminal law and the ICC ’ s complementarity regime increas-
ingly sets the priorities for criminal accountability in many transitional states, 
but the law on economic crimes is far less developed than that relating to 
war crimes or crimes against humanity. One proposed solution has been to 
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designate and defi ne large-scale corruption as a crime against humanity, 199 
but there is much fear that international criminal tribunals or hybrid courts 
could be overloaded if given such a remit. 200 Restitution was not granted at the 
ad hoc tribunals or the hybrid courts of the previous decade. Indeed, if any-
thing, international criminal justice has operated to jeopardise development — 
the extraditions of Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor to Th e Hague 
were facilitated by the threat of withholding aid to Serbia and Liberia. 201 
Th e UN Convention against Corruption criminalises corruption and priori-
tises asset recovery as its  ‘ fundamental principle. ’ 202 While states parties are 
legally obliged to incorporate its measures into national legislation, most of 
the measures therein lie in the realm of civil law. 
 5.2 Truth Commissions 
 Truth commissions off er valuable advantages over trials in terms of reckoning 
with the anonymous catalysers and benefi ciaries of structural violence as they 
employ less individualistic models of accountability, enjoy more lenient stand-
ards of proof, have a more explicitly pedagogical role and have demonstrated 
infi nitely more pliability in terms of abuses covered, remedies awarded and 
agents employed. Nevertheless, when these commissions were being main-
streamed in the late 1980s and 1990s, their understanding of wrongdoing 
during the prior regime was limited to a  ‘ dominant script ’ narrowly focused 
on civil and political rights abuses. 203 It was estimated that only three out of 34 
truth commissions between 1974 and 2004 expressly engaged with economic 
crimes. 204 Abuses which could not be characterised as criminal (i.e. most 
socio-economic rights deprivations) were generally ignored, reinforcing a nar-
rative of confl ict that violence was political, ideological, ethnic or religious, 
and not economic. 205 Everyday life was largely ignored, limiting the  ‘ truth ’ a 
given mechanism could reveal and consequently impeding its transformative 
potential. Latin American truth commissions typically noted the polarisation 
between left and right, the depredations of police and military, the corrup-
tion of the rule of law and the weakness of state institutions, but consciously 
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omitted the socio-economic reasons underlying repressive  behaviour. 206 Th e 
El Salvadorian truth commission focused on non-derogable breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, the ICCPR and the American Convention on Human 
Rights. 207 Chile ’ s infl uential Truth and Reconciliation Commission simi-
larly focussed on bodily integrity violations like disappearances and torture, 
admitting that even though it recognised the  ‘ crisis has deep roots, of a socio-
economic character, it would go beyond its mandate to explore them. ’ 208 
Notwithstanding its statutory remit to establish  ‘ as complete a picture as pos-
sible of the causes, nature and extent of gross violations of human rights, ’ 
the South African TRC ignored corruption, employment patterns and access 
to resources as these matters were outside its mandate, though it did refer 
damningly to the role of business in sustaining apartheid rule, albeit only 
after the Commission ’ s solitary hearing on issues of economic violence. 209 
Th e sustained criticism of the South African body for its neglect of everyday 
living conditions was highly infl uential. 210 In its aftermath, policy-makers 
slowly began to accept that without attention to the enabling environment 
of structural violence, the work of truth commissions would be undermined 
and their impact weakened. 
 Most subsequent truth commissions have been more expansive in their 
approach. Guatemala ’ s Commission on Historical Clarifi cation scrutinised 
the systemic sources of cyclical state violence, and went on to make recom-
mendations relating to social participation of Mayan communities, employ-
ment and integration into state agencies, and the use of indigenous forms 
of confl ict resolution. 211 Th e Sierra Leone TRC examined patterns of social 
injustice and their interaction with confl ict. It made recommendations on 
issues like discriminatory inheritance, skills training, economic empower-
ment, micro-fi nancing schemes and the need to improve opportunities for 
women in the economy. 212 Th e Liberian Truth Commission listed greed and 
corruption as being among the root causes of confl ict surrounding the Taylor 
regime and implicated the international community ’ s hunger for raw materials 
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as a contributory factor in confl ict. 213 Th e Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission examined how horizontal inequalities fed, and were exacerbated 
by, political violence and the role of social exclusion in the recruitment of 
Shining Path guerrillas, and integrated this analysis into a wider critique of 
national economic structures. 214 Th e report of East Timor ’ s Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation incorporated the international coff ee 
trade, environmental degradation, forced displacement and famine. 215 Th e 
mandate of Kenya ’ s Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission extended 
far beyond 2007 ’ s electoral violence to include corruption, displacements and 
irregular acquisitions of land. 216 Chad ’ s truth commission was tasked with 
investigating the fi nances of former president Hiss è ne Habr é and his cro-
nies but went on to highlight corruption, economic mismanagement and 
discrimination within important state institutions. 217 
 In light of these successes, a number of scholars now recommend that 
truth commissions go beyond analysing the structural roots of war or repres-
sion to propose detailed, feasible solutions to the economic problems raised 
that would be acceptable to the public and actionable by the executive. 218 
Truth commissions are seen as the cornerstone of justice, a triggering device 
for reforms and the measure  ‘ best placed to take on the role of  “ spokesper-
son ” for the changes sought by transitional justice ’ because of their moral 
standing and because they provide the largest factual context for legacies of 
socio-economic exploitation. 219 Perhaps most valuably, Laplante argues truth 
commissions can diagnose the state ’ s failure to provide core minimum socio-
economic conditions as rights violations 220 and  ‘ can help initiate a longer-
term reform process by creating the possibility for viewing underlying socio 
economic conditions not as unchangeable facts of life but as consequences of 
conscious policy decisions that fail to protect fundamental rights. ’ 221 
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 However, even where truth commissions meet the four generally-accepted 
criteria for success (independence, adequate resources and subpoena power, 
public hearings and the ability to name accused publicly), 222 advancement does 
not depend purely on technocratic expansion of a truth commission ’ s remit 
and expertise. Truth commissions are undoubtedly valuable as diagnostic tools 
in uncovering what conditions permitted past violations and outlining broad 
general conclusions. However, to make the type of impact some suggest transi-
tional justice should aim for requires complex and technical understandings of 
how government, economies and poverty interact if their recommendations are 
to bridge the gap between comprehension and correction. Unfortunately, the 
operations of truth commissions are far removed from the governance world of 
painful budgetary choices, prioritisation and macro-economic impact. Truth 
commissions are generally made up of a moral elite chosen for their integrity, 
not a technocratic elite chosen for expertise. 223 Genuine socio-economic jus-
tice will require the input of housing, education, health and fi nance ministries 
whose knowledge and skills will surpass those of the truth commission. Truth 
commissions may have representative legitimacy to identify past violations, 
but not necessarily the democratic legitimacy to dictate the disbursement of 
tax revenue or co-ordinate the activities of ministries. Th e South African TRC 
recommended reparations be paid to individual victims, but the elected gov-
ernment countered that the money should be spent on generic community 
needs like education, food and roofs for the homeless. 224 Even advocates of 
a more socio-economic slant to transitional justice accept that truth commis-
sions lack both the professional competences and the authority to make techni-
cal specifi cations 225 or to make informed, strategic recommendations on areas 
like education. 226 If recommendations are posited at broad levels of generality, 
they risk utopianism or vagueness. 227 Th e best a truth commission may be able 
to do in macro-economic terms is to recommend that a certain policy or target 
should be prioritised, 228 but it cannot be presumed this should trump the con-
sidered opinion of civil servants and elected political representatives. 
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 Th ough truth commissions can be improved technically to compensate 
for these weaknesses by expanding their scope and employing more experts, 
their eventual success is ultimately reliant on the state ’ s political will. Th e pre-
sumption of the optimists is that because truth commissions are a democratic 
channel, their proposals would not be  ‘ rejected as disruptive and thus made 
susceptible to repression. ’ 229 However, just as states ratify human rights trea-
ties that they do not abide by, time and time again governments are content 
to reap the reputational rewards of establishing a truth commission without 
using their reports as a blueprint for change. 230 As Mani notes, because execu-
tive commitment to implement truth commission recommendations is fre-
quently lacking, the potential of truth commissions to catalyse institutional 
and structural reforms is  ‘ still-born. ’ 231 Th e East Timorese CAVR report was 
handed over to the Parliament on 28 November 2005 by the then-President 
Xanana Gusmao at the direction of the Parliament, but since that time legis-
lators have never debated its content or recommendations. 232 Th e Peruvian 
TRC was commended earlier for its breadth, but its recommendations on 
structural reform were ignored at the implementation stage. 233 Th e ANC 
government disregarded the vast majority of the TRC ’ s recommendations, 
especially those relating to monetary reparations. 234 In Haiti, the recommen-
dations of both the National Truth and Justice Commission and its Follow-
Up Committee were rejected by the government. 235 
 Explanations for what de Greiff  identifi es as the persistent gap between 
insight and transformation in truth commissions 236 have been sought in 
weak legal traditions 237 and lack of economic growth. 238 Th ough these factors 
are certainly contributory, the weakness of transition overall (of which weak 
rule of law and slow economic growth may be symptomatic) may best explain 
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their consistent failure to make a positive impact. It has been demonstrated 
statistically that negotiated transitions are most strongly associated with truth 
commissions 239 and that truth commissions are correlated with negative 
eff ect on human rights. 240 Th is correlation does not prove that the modalities 
of truth commissions are misguided or counter-productive, but does tend to 
suggest that truth commissions are often established in weak or precarious 
transitions to provide reassurances to still-powerful  ‘ losers ’ in transitions (like 
the erstwhile benefi ciaries of war or repression) that their losses will be lim-
ited. As Arthur admits, the main actors in transition are  ‘ elites who enter into 
a series of bargaining arrangements with one another as a means of managing 
their interests. Th e main focus of these actors is legal-institutional reform, 
rather than transformation at the socio-economic level. ’ 241 Truth commis-
sions are often established as a result of these negotiations not to alter society 
but rather to limit retributive justice (and, it might be added, redistributive 
justice) in an internationally palatable way, even if assertive and ambitious 
commissions attempt to transcend these limitations. 242 Fear of destabilisa-
tion by alienated but powerful groups and the weak position of new regimes 
(a phenomenon that is examined in greater detail in the next section) is 
refl ected globally in the lack of implementation of truth and reconciliation 
commission recommendations. 243 Longer-term impact is also limited by the 
fact that truth commissions do nothing to aff ect the local power relationships 
that impose restraints on the possibilities for justice. 244 Many truth commis-
sion recommendations are implemented only partially or not at all: 
 [T]ruth commissions often exist in a sort of tension between, on the one hand, 
their objectives and results and, on the other hand a reality external to them over 
which they exercise no direct control. 245 
 Given these limitations, which all but the most propitious of transitions 
will struggle with, the ultimate role of truth commissions will be benefi cial 
but far removed from the transformational aspiration for transitional jus-
tice canvassed earlier. Th e legacy of even a quite successful truth commission 
will be less the sea-change in the national economic structure the rhetoric 
would suggest than a series of broad recommendations hostage to numerous 
political fortunes it has no control over. Th e translation of a report into the 
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improvement of everyday lives may remain chimerical. Th e impact of a truth 
commission will always be far more indirect and tentative than the sanguine 
expectations of its more optimistic advocates. What are left are more circum-
scribed, limited but undoubtedly benefi cial tasks. Truth commissions can rec-
ommend a transparent budgetary structure to ensure state revenues are put to 
best use, but may not be able to defi ne the precise shape of it. Th ey can, like 
the South Africa TRC, propose a wealth tax where benefi ciaries of apartheid 
can contribute to poverty reduction or reparations 246 but the tax itself and 
its parameters would remain subject to the give-and-take of parliamentary 
agreement. Truth commissions can recommend the removal of state person-
nel with records of corruption as development blockers even if they cannot 
dictate state policy to their replacements. 247 Th ey can identify national ide-
als even if their concrete elaboration becomes the role of the executive, and 
operate as a powerful lobbying tool against government resistance even if 
they never become program designers. 248 Furthermore, the value of truth 
commissions in establishing a contextual background for trials, compensa-
tion, restitution and reparations cannot be gainsaid (for example, the Chilean 
government provides a monthly pension, school tuition and medical coverage 
to thousands of victims of dictatorial rule as a result of TRC recommenda-
tions). One of the reasons why truth commissions are criticised for delivering 
less than they promise is because this promise is pitched at an unreasonable, 
virtually  ‘ magical ’ level that cannot be attained in the conditions of transi-
tion. 249 Scholars of truth commissions have long accepted that they can help 
create conditions in which reconciliation might occur, but cannot be tasked 
with generating that reconciliation. 250 Similarly, it might be wise to accept 
that truth commissions can help create an atmosphere conducive to a more 
just economy, but may lack the political support or institutional capacity to 
directly advance the process. 
 5.3. Reparations 
 Reparations are possibly the best example of how socio-economic justice in 
transitional justice has been mainstreamed. Overshadowed by trials, truth 
commissions and lustration in the earliest debates, reparations received 
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noticeably less attention within the fi eld. 251 One prominent objection was 
the fact that no fi nancial measures could be commensurate with violations 
suff ered. 252 Some contested the moral propriety of a new government and 
successor generations not implicated in prior wrongdoing (and often defi ned 
by opposition to it) having to pay for the crimes of the  ancien regime . 253 
Th e scholarly fear that reparations would unacceptably monetise atrocity by 
 ‘ elevating things over persons ’ 254 was made apparent by the Argentine  Madres 
de la Plaza de Mayo ’ s rejection of compensation as blood money to silence 
legitimate victim complaints that might arise in the future. 255 
 However, over time it became apparent that this principled stance could 
not be replicated by all survivors of confl ict or authoritarianism who might 
endure poverty, hunger or homelessness. Increasingly in international human 
rights law the state is made liable for human rights violations either as the 
violator, on the grounds of omission to prevent, or as the subsidiary agent of 
compensation when the actual perpetrator cannot be identifi ed or is unable 
to compensate. Th e entitlement of victims of grave human rights violations 
to reparations as rights-holders was recognised in a number of human rights 
instruments and conventions, but found its most comprehensive expression 
in the General Assembly ’ s  Declaration of Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
in 2005. 256 Th e Principles outline that the victim is entitled to remedies that 
guarantee ( a ) equal and eff ective access to justice, ( b ) adequate, eff ective and 
prompt reparation for harm suff ered, and ( c ) access to relevant information 
concerning violations and reparation mechanisms, though these as yet remain 
mostly in the realm of moral duty than enforceable legal obligation. 257 Repa-
rations are no longer regarded as empty promises, temporary stopgap meas-
ures, or attempts to buy the silence of victims. 258 
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 Reparations are popular for a number of very obvious reasons. Th ey can be 
justifi ed intrinsically (victims deserve reparations) and instrumentally (they 
are needed to stabilise the transition). 259 Th ey are less abstract than truth or 
justice, the most tangible proof of a state ’ s willingness to make amends. 260 
Consequently, reparations are assumed to have the greatest potential to make 
a diff erence in the lives of victims. 261 Th ey can be faster to arrive than truth or 
justice as it is generally quicker and easier to identify a victim than to establish 
the guilt of a perpetrator. Th e material benefi t of monetary support is obvious 
(though rarely, if ever, adequate), but reparations transcend their compens-
atory role to enable some less tangible rewards. Reparations can  ‘ meet bur-
ning needs for acknowledgement, closure, vindication and connection. ’ 262 By 
demonstrating the seriousness with which the state now treats violations of 
rights, they promote civil trust. 263 
 Th e  Basic Principles distinguish four categories of reparation, namely resti-
tution, compensation, rehabilitation and the guarantee of non-repetition. 264 
In states like South Africa and Chile, violations of civil and political rights 
were chosen as the  ‘ point of entry ’ for reparations, as opposed to economic, 
social and cultural rights. 265 Th is tended to favour individualised reparations 
such as compensation in the form of cash payments or pensions, and restitu-
tion in the form of returning property. However, it became apparent that the 
number of victims would always outstrip the fi nance available for reparations. 
As Kritz points out, while states like Chile, with a relatively healthy economy 
and a small, defi ned class of victims of state violence, could off er equitable 
and extensive compensation to individuals, this becomes impossible in a state 
like Rwanda where the handful of victims compensated satisfactorily (to the 
extent this can be said about any genocide reparations) would deplete the 
available funding for the vast majority of victims. 266 Comprehensive indi-
vidual restitution programs run the obvious risk of burdening national budg-
ets indefi nitely, stripping the government of the funding needed to rebuild 
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the economy and state. Even if adequate resources were available, civil and 
political violation-based criteria for eligibility left communities that suff ered 
serious forms of social and economic exclusion unsatisfi ed and created divi-
sions within communities between the compensated and those who received 
little or nothing. 267 
 As the scope of inquiry of TRCs expanded, it became undeniable that 
the same state and sub-state structures that led to bodily integrity abuses 
and seizure of property also led to unjust deprivation of jobs, of educational 
opportunities, healthcare and infrastructural investment. In keeping with the 
generational change in transitional justice from an intrinsic, backwards-looking 
concern with punishment and truth to a more forward-looking, state-
building perspective, the fact that compensation and restitution were not in 
themselves sustainable nor did much to address poverty sustainably called 
into question the instrumental value of traditional modes of reparation. Con-
sequently, there is an observable redirection towards reparations programs 
of greater complexity where a public good is distributed to a specifi c victim 
community, incorporating structural and sustainable collective benefi ts like 
reconstruction of destroyed public buildings, religious sites, education or 
health facilities, and symbolic measures such as public apologies, memorials 
and the re-naming public spaces. 268 Rubio-Mar í n, perhaps more accurately, 
uses the terminology of corrective reparations (i.e., giving adequate redress 
to victims) and transformative reparations (advancing the consolidation of 
a more inclusive democratic system). 269 Truth commissions nowadays typi-
cally propose a mix of the individual and collective, the corrective and the 
transformative. 
 Th e problem that has arisen is that this transformative approach to col-
lective reparations is often indistinguishable in practice from development 
funding. In theory, the two should be separate in conception and delivery. 
In conceptual terms, development is the province of sustained, concerted 
actions to improve the economic, political, and social well-being of all people 
in a state or defi ned local area dominated by metrics like need and sustain-
ability. While reparations also take need and sustainability into account, they 
uniquely address actual damage suff ered by a defi ned set of people acknowl-
edged as victims. Th is conceptual distinction between improving well-being 
generally and repairing harm more narrowly has traditionally been refl ected in 
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the means of delivery — as Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky point out, reparations 
are the domain of human rights courts, claims commissions and administra-
tive programs while development subsumes a much wider array of agencies 
like INGOs, aid agencies and fi nancial institutions. 270 Th e reason for the 
growing confl ation of reparations with development is a simple economic 
one — in post-authoritarian and post-confl ict situations, extreme poverty is 
the norm and the available resources are extremely limited. Money for repa-
ration generally comes from general taxation, as opposed to re-appropriated 
loot. Compensating all the victims of socio-economic deprivations like those 
who suff ered unemployment, corruption etc. would be beyond most repara-
tions programs, which tend to be drastically under-funded. In this context, 
the estimated US $ 385m set aside for apartheid victims in South Africa or 
the US $ 45–60 per annum ring-fenced for Peru ’ s 200,000 victims of human 
rights violations are both pitifully small in relation to the overall number of 
victims and rather large in terms of the national budget. 271 Reparations may 
take up a signifi cant proportion of available funds but be too small or scatter-
gun to make any appreciable impact on growth or redistribution. 272 
 Th e consistent response of transitional states has been to prefer using fi nite 
resources for general development than particularised reparations. Just as col-
lective reparations maximise the eff ectiveness of existing resources better than 
individual reparations, so too does subsuming collective reparations within 
development: 
 [G]overnments tend to prefer the use of collective reparations, often for pragmatic 
reasons. Collective reparations may allow them to funnel programs into existing 
ministries, seem more effi  cient and less likely to be politically sensitive, require less 
new bureaucracy, and seem more acceptable to budget-conscious managers and 
creditors. Nonexclusive reparations also avoid problems associated with singling 
out victims or creating new resentments. 273 
 Th ere is in this approach an implied recognition that reparations are an 
imperfect vehicle for restoring losses as complex as careers, opportunities and 
health, and that more forward-looking reforms are better public policy. 274 For 
example, the Haitian government has decided to use the US $ 5.8bn repatri-
ated from Swiss Bank accounts on Baby Doc Duvalier ’ s return for improving 
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national living standards for all instead of awarding it to identifi ed victims 
or victim communities. 275 Th ough the Peruvian TRC recommended a com-
prehensive slate of reparations such as healthcare, educational opportuni-
ties and restitution, the government made clear it preferred a more general 
social development program. 276 Victim-survivors there have been shunted 
into pre-existing development and poverty-alleviation programs, while the 
government attempted to distribute the funds for collective reparation pro-
grams through competition. 277 Th e general perception is that the govern-
ment ’ s reparations program does not correspond with specifi c damage caused 
by war and is instead more akin to development. 278 Th e Guatemalan truth 
commission sat somewhat on the fence, recommending both individual and 
collective reparations but stating that the latter should  ‘ also favour the entire 
population, without distinction between victims and perpetrators. ’ 279 In the 
seminal  AZAPO case, the South African constitutional court acknowledged 
that because the new constitutional state was tasked with reconciling and 
reconstructing the country, it would inevitably at some point have to choose 
whether to deploy national resources through reparations or to use available 
fi nances for food relief, housing and education. It held that parliament was 
justifi ed in adopting a wide concept of reparations that would be commu-
nally balanced against the state ’ s other obligations. 280 
 Th is approach has divided opinion, once more illustrating the gap between 
transitional justice as traditionally understood and the more expansive hopes 
held out for it by some. Roht-Arriaza contends that equating collective repa-
rations with development more generally  ‘ confl ates two separate obligations 
of government: to make reparation for wrongs it committed, and to provide 
essential services to the population. ’ 281 Victims believe that development is 
a pre-existing duty of the government, feel that incorporating reparations 
within development gives insuffi  cient recognition to the violations they have 
suff ered, and resent it when non-victims benefi t from such programs. 282 
Some argue that collective reparations have less trust-building power than 
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individualised reparations derived from the recognition of responsibility 
by the perpetrator or the state would have. 283 Others question whether the 
undiff erentiated envelopment of reparations within development may violate 
their essential character as acts of atonement for past harms. 284 By contrast, 
Kalmanowitz and Miller respectively argue that the focus on certain groups 
for certain violations erases the needs of the wider population from view 285 
and makes structural factors  ‘ doubly invisible. ’ 286 As the former puts it: 
 [T]he more widespread and extensive the destruction caused by war, the weaker the 
rights [should be] to receive reparations. In the limiting case of a war that aff ects 
directly a large majority of the population (for example, Mozambique), rights and 
obligations of social justice should trump all rights of corrective justice. 287 
 He recommends the mass pooling of all compensatory payments into a col-
lective reconstruction fund to be dispersed in a forward-looking way accord-
ing to broader principles of justice than have hitherto underpinned debates 
over reparations. 288 
 Th e problem with changing from the traditional reparative allocation of 
resources based on entitlements to an allocation based on present or future 
needs is that it risks becoming completely uninformed by anything distinctly 
recognisable as transitional justice. Sceptics legitimately question is whether 
such measures would  ‘ really still be part of transitional justice. ’ 289 Key ques-
tions that a transformative reparations policy would have to ask like whether 
citizenship in the violator state alone entitles one to indemnifi cation, to what 
extent general taxation should be used, the liability of foreign governments and 
how much this liability can be encompassed within aid, how compensatory 
amounts should be decided or whether to compensate whole villages (or valleys, 
or provinces) would be dominated by state politicians or development actors 
given the relative paucity of reparations. Th e tail is unlikely to wag the dog —
 though useful in rebalancing power relations at a local level, reparations have 
little macro-economic impact 290 and do not radically redistribute power or 
wealth, 291 while no direct correlations can be drawn between the largesse of 
287Rhetoric and Realpolitik
 292.  De Greiff ,  Transitional Justice, Security and Development ,  supra note 261, at 6. 
 293.  Andrieu,  ‘ Dealing With a  “ New ” Grievance ’ ,  supra note 115, at 538. 
a reparations program and the degree of socio-economic development of the 
state in question. 292 Far from steering debates on the socio-economic future 
of the state or tackling poverty, the more reparations become intermingled 
with state reconstruction and development, the more they have to plead for 
their own distinctiveness or relevance. As with trials and truth commissions, 
while reparations can make signifi cant, targeted impacts, it would appear the 
wider potential for reparations to signifi cantly impact poverty and develop-
ment are greatly over-stated. 
 5.4. Summary 
 None of the foregoing analysis of the limitations of trials, truth commis-
sions and reparations is to argue that all claims based on practicality have 
merit. While all the institutions of transitional justice have immense practi-
cal shortcomings, there can be very valuable synergies between transitional 
justice and development or poverty reduction, particularly the diagnostic role 
of truth commissions and compensatory role of reparations. However, even 
with a more realistic appraisal of their technical potential, the socio-economic 
legacy of transitional justice bodies may be minimal. Th ough they criticise 
the liberal-legalism of transitional justice, the following section illustrates that 
advocates of an expanded role for transitional justice fall into the same trap as 
legalism of overestimating the impact of normative change and underestimat-
ing the infl uence of external political factors. 
 6. Th e Political Economy of Transition 
 If the conception of  justice does not explain the lack of impact of transi-
tional justice on socio-economic structures, development or inequality, it is 
worthwhile switching attention to the other composite element of the con-
cept, namely the  transitional . As argued earlier, believers in the distributive 
potential of transitional justice rely on the presumption that the sheer fact of 
transition constitutes a window of opportunity  ‘ not only for returning to a 
previous state of order but for deeply reforming it and dismantling old struc-
tures of economic crime, structural violence, and oppression. ’ 293 Th is greater 
ambition springs from a welcome critique of the liberalising impetus of the 
transitional political order, most notably the recognition that the fi eld ’ s con-
centration on the legal and political machinery of the new regime would ben-
efi t from a re-orientation towards economic and social conditions.  However, 
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it cannot be assumed that post-authoritarian or post-confl ict  transitions 
where everything is  ‘ up for grabs ’ politically off er the same scope for change 
in the economic arena. Transition is fundamentally a political phenomenon. 
Even if pre-transitional politics or confl ict are driven by socio-economic fac-
tors and even if a relatively stable transition is to a government committed 
at least minimally to democracy and human rights, the widening of political 
opportunity does not automatically mean there has been any corresponding 
opening in the spheres of production, distribution, consumption or transfer 
of wealth in the economy overall. 294 Transition is instead typically character-
ised or defi ned primarily in political terms by military victory, a peace agree-
ment, a referendum, elections or a combination of these. 
 Transition occurs along a transformative continuum ranging from conserv-
ative to radical change. 295 However, even very dramatic transitions like those 
in the Ivory Coast or Egypt or (possibly) Myanmar are rarely  ‘ so large, so per-
vasive, and so abrupt ’ that they can properly be called revolutions where a cul-
ture or society is totally remaking itself and where there is obvious potential 
for substantial displacement of economic structures. 296 Miller laments that 
 ‘ the failure to include economic concerns in transitional justice mechanisms 
tends to make transition into a political rather than an economic story, ’ but 
this is to confuse the causal relationship between transition and transitional 
justice. 297 Notwithstanding the liminality implied by its name, transitional 
justice usually occurs after the fundamental bargain underpinning transition 
is already agreed. Issues of resources, tax and revenue generation are central 
to peace agreements or regime change arrangements. As Wilson notes, the 
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area of justice is the one in which the civil groups that typically press for 
 transitional justice paradoxically  ‘ are usually the least eff ective in shaping the 
course of talks, and where the two protagonists in the confl ict act most expe-
diently to protect their interests. It is one of the most elitist of all the issues 
in transitional negotiations, and the one in which leaders are most likely to 
reach a deal over the heads of ordinary people. ’ 298 Human rights groups are 
rarely serious players in transitional political coalitions and lack suffi  cient 
clout to critically aff ect the will to reform. 299 
 Even in a relatively benign transition, of the four sources of power typically 
contested in war to peace transitions, namely military, political, ideological 
and economic, the last of these will generally see the least change. 300 As a 
result, transition is very rarely an economic story as economic conditions sel-
dom change systematically in the way the political system may have. Indeed, 
it is this very lack of change between pre- and post-transitional conditions 
that compelled the re-examination of transitional justice. However, the lack 
of economic transition — the continuing dominance on the part of elites or 
groups of the economy even if no longer accompanied by corresponding 
political control — is also what makes more redistributive or developmental 
approaches more diffi  cult. Th e explanation for transitional justice ’ s inability 
to make an appreciable impact on socio-economic structures is not the scope 
of transitional justice or the principles underlying it, but is actually the transi-
tion itself. 
 Th e tension between the ideals of justice and opportunity is one that has 
been present in transitional justice since its formative period. It is generally 
accepted that transitional justice policy depends on principled beliefs as well 
as politics, that it can be both ideational and epiphenomenal. Teitel recon-
ciled the idealist and realist arguments, arguing that justice is extraordinary 
and constructivist — the potential scope of transition justice is defi ned by sur-
rounding political conditions and balances of power, but once undertaken 
it can exercise a degree of infl uence on the nature of the transition itself, 
maintaining order but enabling transformation. 301 However, because most 
transitions are pacted or subject to peace agreement and often characterised 
by some degree of power-sharing (political, economic, military), these transi-
tions will often veer more towards conservativism in its relation to the prede-
cessor regime and its value systems. Th is in turn impacts on the prospects for 
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economic justice — transitions are typically more about modifying the  existing 
order politically than any thoroughgoing process of social  transformation. 
Cession of political power may therefore not be accompanied by cession of 
property or resources. As Mani puts it,  ‘ faced with powerful lobbies resisting 
economic distribution, peacebuilders may turn to political  ‘ redistribution ’ by 
way of elections as a stopgap measure. ’ 302 
 Th e two decades of accelerated norm diff usion since transitional justice was 
mainstreamed have done little to alter the transitional stability calculus — the 
strength of the transition relative to the power of the  ancien regime remains far 
more infl uential than the normative infl uence of international criminal law, 
international human rights law or civil society. For example, through analysis 
and coding of the pace of numerous transition types, Olsen, Payne and Reiter 
fi nd that since the 1970s, a  ‘ clean break with the past ’ such as overthrow, col-
lapse or military defeat remains far more conducive to trial (the usual proxy 
employed for extensive transitional justice) than a negotiated transition, with 
trials being twice as frequent. 303 Furthermore, negotiated transitions are most 
strongly associated with truth commissions or no transitional justice at all. 304 
Optimistic accounts of transitional justice ’ s distributive potential exaggerate 
the ability of transitional justice to  ‘ set the tone ’ for future governance 305 —
 political transition is continuously negotiated by dynamic, non-teleological 
relations of control and consent, power and authority among multiple power 
poles, some of whom will be the inevitable (and extremely reluctant) losers in 
any distributive process and therefore resist it. 306 Transitional justice therefore 
is a game of relatives not absolutes: the prospects for goals like land reform, 
return of ill-gotten profi ts by corporations and higher tax-burdens to rebal-
ance the distribution of wealth should be determined not merely by the mech-
anisms available but also the opposition to be faced in a mediated state. 307 
 Th e conviction that transitional justice can and should impact signifi cantly 
on the macro-economic structures of all transitional states everywhere can be 
sustained only if the internal dynamics of the populations for which they were 
intended are disregarded, a recurring problem that bedevils the fi eld. 308 Space 
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precludes a detailed examination of the political economy of  transitional 
states generally, which in any event will display infi nite variation. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to briefl y outline four salient limitations transitions impose 
on the prospects for economic justice that will lie largely outside the control 
of transitional justice institutions regardless of the extent to which the fi eld 
re-imagines its principles and practices: 
 1.  Th e transitional stability calculus which leaves economic structures intact 
 2.  Th e complexity of patterns of accumulation under authoritarian rule and 
war economies 
 3.  Democratically expressed preferences 
 4.  Th e infl uence of global neo-liberalism 
 6.1. Th e Transitional Stability Calculus 
 It is something of a commonplace that transitional justice ’ s role in accounting 
for past wrongdoing lies in tension with its role in establishing stability. As 
Addison argues, while some transitions from authoritarianism to democracy 
have been successful,  ‘ others remain tentative, and some have been reversed 
with either a relapse into full dictatorship or with the trappings of democ-
racy used to cloak semi-authoritarianism. ’ 309 Carothers argues that most 
post-authoritarian transitions are to a political  ‘ gray zone ’ between liberal 
democracy and authoritarianism that maintains attributes of democratic life 
while the government disregards the law. 310 Periods of transition in partially 
democratised countries are those when risk of state failure is greatest. 311 Post-
confl ict states are even more insecure — 44% of post-war states see a resump-
tion of confl ict within fi ve years and 50% revert back to war in their fi rst 
decade. 312 Th e war/peace distinction is increasingly viewed as a misleading 
one that obscures the sometimes dysfunctional nature of the peace. Peace 
may be more a reluctant hiatus in confl ict born of fatigue than a process that 
results in genuine pacifi cation between antagonistic groups. 313 Transition 
is also a time marked by unemployment, external debt, underdevelopment 
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and hyperinfl ation, which themselves are destabilising. Consequently, many 
transitions are marked by a conservative approach to economic structures. 
Th e more assertively states fl ex their muscles against those who benefi tted 
materially from confl ict or authoritarianism, the greater the risk may be of 
undermining economic activity or even the political settlement outlined in a 
peace deal. 314 
 Th is risk is best illustrated by examples of the choices made even in rela-
tively stable transitions. In Guatemala, those who signed the peace agreement 
(the liberal-conservative ruling party and the rebels) and those who supported 
it (civil society) were vastly outweighed in political-economic infl uence by 
the outgoing armed forces of the regime and the business elites who prof-
ited from past structural violence. 315 While progress on issues of identity 
and civil-political rights like cultural diversity, education reform, participa-
tion and political reform could be conceded, socio-economic reform aimed 
at reducing horizontal inequalities stalled. 316 Th ough the UN-brokered peace 
agreement stipulated democracy and reform of both army and governmental 
institutions, El Salvador ’ s ARENA government resisted socio-economic redis-
tribution in negotiations with leftist rebels lest it undermine its power-base in 
the business community. 317 Wood argues the peace agreement there refl ected 
an explicit exchange of political inclusion for the rebels for the economic 
elite ’ s continued control of assets, thereby preventing signifi cant economic 
redistribution, even if there was ultimately some re-allocation of land. 318 Th e 
economic power of whites in South Africa was allied to the risk of collaps-
ing the transition to democratic rule to foreclose an expansive conception 
of transitional justice. 319 National reconciliation in Namibia and post-Smith 
Zimbabwe was similarly dictated by the need to avoid antagonising the white 
community politically and economically. 320 
 In more precarious transitions, political change is often to a form of bel-
ligerent power-sharing where those formerly in power try to maximise their 
economic gains even if political power is conceded. Th is should come as no 
293Rhetoric and Realpolitik
 321.  Alex  Dupuy ,  Th e Prophet and Power:  Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the International Community, 
and Haiti ( Rowman  & Littlefi eld:  Lanham ,  MA ,  2007 ) . 
 322.  Antonio  Giustozzi ,  ‘ War and Peace Economies of Afghanistan ’ s Strongmen ’ ,  14  Interna-
tional Peacekeeping ( 2006 )  75 – 89 at 86 . 
 323.  De Greiff ,  Transitional Justice, Security and Development, supra note 261, at 20. 
 324.  Olsen, Payne and Reiter,  Transitional Justice in Balance ,  supra note 5, at 5. 
 325.  De Greiff ,  ‘ Articulating the Links ’ ,  supra note 52, at 41. 
surprise — oppressive regimes install themselves in order to pursue certain 
economic policies that sustain their rule. If the violent suppression of under-
privileged groups to safeguard economic power led to pre-transitional war 
or repression, the threat of its renewal remains pertinent in anything but the 
rare case of total defeat. Where internal or global power relations compel the 
removal of that regime, their economic interests and investments might endure 
long beyond the return to democracy. Jean-Bertrand Aristide ’ s fi rst radically 
egalitarian government in Haiti was overthrown after only seven months by the 
business community and upper echelons of the military who feared redistribu-
tion of wealth. 321 Th e economic power of regional warlords in Afghanistan 
was such that observers feared prosecuting them would boil down to a choice 
between justice and development. As Giustozzi put it, such an option would 
rule out any concept of  ‘ transitional justice ’ in Afghanistan, which would tar-
get many if not all leading strongmen. ’ 322 Perhaps the most dramatic example 
of the sacrifi ce of economic justice to stability is in the persistent disparity 
between international aid given to security sector reform (and in particular 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) and that given to reparations: 
 Th e realities of aid fl ows and of local expenditures refl ect this asymmetry regarding 
 ‘ security ’ and  ‘ justice ’ concerns: of the 22 countries with ongoing DDR programs 
in a recent global study, programs involving 1.25 million benefi ciaries and the 
expenditure of more than 2 billion dollars, only a few have discussed the 
possibility of establishing reparations programs, but none of these countries has 
implemented one. 323 
 Of course, one can argue that states should take greater risks in transition, 
but the general practice of new democracies is to move cautiously and resist 
testing the stability of transition. 324 States are more likely to adopt an ini-
tial  ‘ weak state perspective ’ emphasising transitional stability, realistic goals 
for the state and incremental institutional development than choose risky 
confrontations with powerful groups. De Greiff , for example, argues that if 
expanding the scope of justice leads entrenched, powerful economic elites to 
oppose or block transition, it might be favourable to postpone dealing with 
these issues until more favourable times. 325 Th is appears to be the implicit 
position in many transitions. 
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 6.2.  Th e Complexities of Patterns of Accumulation in War 
Economies and Authoritarianism 
 Even if incoming governments are in favour of redistribution, even if transi-
tional justice mechanisms are geared towards it, and even if a favourable secu-
rity environment obtains, patterns of accumulation in war economies and 
authoritarianism are highly complex and not amenable to easy solution. All 
forms of structural and cultural violence are abstract, often elusive and deeply 
resistant to change. 326 In the heightened diffi  culty of transitional ecologies, 
attempts to expand the focus of transitional justice to economic crimes or 
redistribution would incur the same types of automatic political resistance by 
privileged groups that non-transitional bids to tackle corruption or inequal-
ity have traditionally incurred. 327 Confl icts between the state and non-state 
actors over revenue streams and spoils the latter enjoyed before transition can 
signifi cantly impair development, the equality agenda or poverty alleviation 
even where they do not destabilise transition. 
 Authoritarian regimes are associated with behaviours such as unproductive 
expenditures on agencies such as the army, abuses of natural resources, the 
channelling of infrastructure and investment to sympathetic regions, groups 
or individuals, undisciplined rent-seeking and favouritism in the distribution 
of legal permits, government grants, special tax breaks, or other forms of diri-
gisme. Th ese behaviours are notoriously persistent after transition. 328 Democ-
ratisation does not inoculate the state against deleterious everyday abuses like 
tax evasion, black markets, corruption and non-observance of effi  cient eco-
nomic norms that can be more damaging than outright kleptocracy. 329 Th is 
problem is exacerbated in times of military confl ict. It is generally accepted 
that extractive, coercive and/or illegal war economies can prosper without the 
state and that war can be a sustainable system of economic organisation. 330 
Public goods once provided by the state like security or health become priva-
tised by non-state actors, natural resources like mines or sea-lanes can be cap-
tured, while political, ethnic or religious factions can establish areas of control 
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where they can levy taxes. Because in war these activities have high risks and 
high barriers to entry, they yield exceptionally high returns. 331 
 Two particular problems fl ow from these complex patterns of accumula-
tion that transitional justice scholarship has downplayed or ignored. Th e fi rst 
is the sheer diffi  culty of re-appropriating revenue streams and resources for the 
good of the commonweal even where considerable political will exists to do so. 
Th e problem here is not instability so much as the untouchability that results 
from the agentless and macro-economic nature of systematic inequality — 
the benefi ciaries of these practices are more  ‘ amorphous ’ ,  ‘ nameless ’ and  ‘ face-
less ’ than those who commit defi ned crimes. 332 To the extent that property 
rights are even semi-secure, there are strict limits to what most transi-
tional governments can do. 333 Th e temptation for many governments in 
these situations is to allow those who have gained from the inequities of the 
pre-transitional period to continue their economic activities because they 
generate employment and to instead inculcate their interest in the long-term 
well-being of the state. 334 Given the diffi  culties of securing access to illicit 
gains, pragmatism may lead governments  ‘ to recognise the role played by 
the strongmen in the economy, remove the uncertainty about their fate and 
off er selective incentives to invest in long-term businesses in order to speed 
up their conversion from  “ robber barons ” to legitimate magnates. ’ 335 Short-
term growth may trump the longer-term imperatives of transitional justice. 
For example, the Mbeki government in South Africa resisted the possibility 
of apartheid victims seeking reparations from multi-national corporations for 
fear of jeopardising employment and investment. 336 
 Th e second problem that fl ows from these complex patterns of accumu-
lation is antipathy to the state-building process on the part of those who 
stand to lose. Any interaction of transitional justice with developmental con-
cerns will inevitably be state-centred and organised conceptually along the 
lines of the nation-state because only the state has the resource-base, coer-
cive capacity and administrative facility to make signifi cant inroads into 
reducing  inequalities. 337 However, any state that can achieve the results 
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which  advocates argue an expanded transitional justice may catalyse betrays 
 ideal-typical visions of the transitioning state as the monopolist of physi-
cal violence, as bureaucratically capable, as the aggregate of individual refer-
ences and as a legitimate political-territorial entity that is wildly at odds with 
the typical transitional polity, particularly in the developing world. Th e ten-
dency of transitional justice to  ‘ see like the state ’ has operated to oversimplify 
dilemmas of transition and has failed to engage with local power structures, 
thereby encouraging grass-roots resistance. 338 Th ese non-state political orders 
may operate parallel to, or independently of, the state. 339 Redistributive jus-
tice is not simply about conceiving justice holistically enough or calibrat-
ing institutions suffi  ciently — it is about resolving collective action problems 
where those who gain and lose power in transition are unable or unwilling 
to work towards the goals of development and equality. Solutions premised 
on the eff ectiveness and legitimacy of the state in question, or those based on 
the assumption that all states generally should function the same way, may 
struggle to attain the emancipatory potential assigned to them in textbook 
discussions. Th e primary reason for this is that continued state failure or the 
incapacity of the state to resume control over the political and economic 
space is highly conducive to elite retention of wealth, even if it imposes sig-
nifi cant costs on ordinary people. 340 As B ø å s points out: 
 Most international interventions in fact overlook the deliberate aspect of state 
failure: the extent to which regimes allow and enable state recession in order to 
serve their own fi nancial and security interests, regardless of the best interests of 
the people … . Th ese interventions are therefore severely compromised, insofar as 
they are trying to  ‘ fi x ’ that which is probably broken for a reason. Even where this 
programming occurs in the context of post-confl ict peace-building operations, the 
fact of  … regime shift does not necessarily change the incentives for continued 
state recession and informalization, as the pathologies that created these incentives 
typically remain intact. 341 
 Th ough transition may end the confl ict which permitted these activities, these 
spoilers may reject the state-building process  ‘ because they believe it poses a 
fundamental threat to their political or economic interests. Th is can include 
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so-called warlords for whom the return of the rule of law could result in their 
marginalization  … businesspeople whose activities are illicit, and whole clans 
that have benefi tted from armed occupation of valuable real estate during the 
war. ’ 342 Th e maintenance of the state in a low-equilibrium trap may be highly 
attractive to economic elites who can operate as both economic spoilers and 
governance spoilers if transition endangers their wealth. 343 
 6.3. Democratically-Expressed Preferences 
 One of the notable features of the advocacy in transitional justice scholar-
ship for a redistributive/egalitarian/developmental role for transitional justice 
is the lack of reference to the ideological commitments of the government 
that will ultimately be responsible for implementing transitional justice or, 
put more simply, the policies and parties the people of the state have actu-
ally voted for. Th e aforementioned spectres of destabilisation, capital fl ight 
and the bargains of transition will condition what parties campaign on and 
what the mandate of government will be. As Mani argues, the opening of 
political windows through elections may shut the door to economic reform 
by stiff ening the will of those benefi tting from inequalities to resist change —
 electoral democracy does not necessarily improve the prospects for economic 
equality. 344 
 Centrist or centre-right policies may not be adopted solely from duress of 
circumstances, however. In every transitional state, the fundamental dilemma 
for the prospective new leadership will be the balance to be struck between 
the distributive justice perspective which directs resources to those who have 
suff ered past wrongs and the economic effi  ciency perspective which directs 
resources to those who can exploit them most effi  ciently (of course, as the 
earlier examination of reparations suggests, there may be overlap between 
the two). 345 Many states will pursue growth before redistribution, taking the 
position that it is better to increase the size of the pie for all than to divide a 
smaller one up, 346 or adopt a stance where revenue generation precedes ser-
vice delivery. Others will simply choose the path of least resistance, adopting 
economic policies that might promote pre-crisis levels of economic activity 
in a way that minimises politico-economic problems. 347 Because the state 
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may have been weakened in confl ict or authoritarianism, the government ’ s 
 ability to engage constructively in the economy may be signifi cantly weak-
ened, making market-oriented policies attractive. 348 
 As a result, many transitions are to popularly-elected centrist or centre-
right governments whose policies are markedly diff erent to the redistributive 
and developmental policies truth commissions and reparations programs will 
recommend or attempt. In Africa, for example, instead of a focus on sys-
tematic redistribution and equality of opportunity, civil society and political 
parties typically embrace a limited social compact framed by the precepts of 
the liberal tradition like rule of law, political freedoms, property rights and 
separation of powers. 349 Committed advocates of wider reform are usually a 
minority and struggle to marshal enough political resources to overcome the 
residual power of  ancien regime fi gures. 350 Th ere is a presumption in the tran-
sitional justice literature that governmental legitimacy  ‘ is inextricably linked 
to redistribution and redress of patterns of discrimination. ’ 351 However, this 
is open to the criticism that development is being examined through an overly 
Western lens in which welfare ranks much higher on the list of priorities than 
it does when viewed through the lens of the domestic political culture of the 
transitional society itself, where no such expectation may ever have attached 
to the state. 352 Redistributive or welfarist states are the product of unique 
historical and social processes. By contrast, in many states where the state 
has behaved in a predatory or abusive manner in the past, basic security and 
local autonomy may top the hierarchy of goods the state is expected to pro-
vide. Th ough many scholars (the author included) might conclude that such 
minimalist policies risk reinforcing pre-transitional equalities, it is necessary 
to remember that the government itself might disagree, imposing signifi cant 
limitations on what even the most immaculately calibrated truth commis-
sions or reparations programs can achieve. 
 Even transitions to ostensibly social-democratic governments rarely see 
considerations of equality trump power politics or discourses of entitlement 
based on participation in the pre-transitional struggle. Formal democrati-
sation in Mozambique and Angola has seen the leftist Frelimo and MPLA 
build single-party systems to tightly control state resources through and 
for their own structures. 353 Democracy itself can have adverse implications 
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for development by providing systematic, long-term incentives to purchase 
state infl uence, collect rents to fi nance campaigns and distribute resources to 
supporters. 354 
 6.4. Th e Infl uence of Global Neo-Liberalism 
 Th ough the previous section argued that many transitional states will priori-
tise growth over redistribution or the immediate securing of social minima, 
not all liberal economic programs are freely adopted. Neo-liberal globalisa-
tion provides the inescapable background against which all peace-building 
activities take place. As noted above, transition is also a time marked by 
unemployment, external debt, underdevelopment and hyperinfl ation. States 
urgently require international fi nancial assistance, but to secure it must agree 
to conditional loans or structural adjustment policies that emphasise rapid 
market de-regulation, reductions in expenditure on welfare, a small state and 
privatisation of national resources to avoid economic chaos. 
 Th e pernicious impact of the neo-liberal cure in terms of the long-term 
stability of the state is well understood in transitional justice literature, 355 
but the relative ability of states to resist it does not appear to be. Loans and 
structural adjustment policies may undermine state capacity or the pursuit 
of development in the medium- and long-term, but are extremely tempting 
in the short-term as they may bolster political stability by mitigating or over-
coming fi nancial crises. 356 Transitional justice must grapple with the regret-
table reality that the imperatives of the global economy signifi cantly limit 
the agency of the state to reform the economy for the benefi t of the socially 
excluded, let alone transitional justice institutions. Privatisation, austerity and 
economic liberalisation tend to eliminate discretionary expenditure. Th ese 
policies are often not chosen by the transitional government, but rather are 
imposed on states by the threat to withhold loans or demand interest at a time 
when economies are vulnerable and fi nancial support is needed to prevent 
economic crisis. 357 
 Given the neoliberal-capitalist demands of the world economy and 
Bretton Woods institutions if the state is to receive funding or participate in 
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world trade, scholars must question more critically whether the  expectation 
that the temporary, ad hoc and cash-strapped institutions of transitional 
justice can enjoy anything more than marginal infl uence on domestic eco-
nomic or development policies is legitimate. Th e paradigmatic example is the 
South African ANC ’ s abandonment of its pre-transitional policy framework 
of redistribution, nationalisation and progressive taxation in favour of eco-
nomic liberalisation and marketisation to secure a much-needed IMF loan in 
the mind-1990s. 358 As Nagy notes, this policy shift had a lasting eff ect on the 
parameters of the truth and reconciliation process there and facilitated denial 
of responsibility on the part of economic elites. 359 Th e causal relationship 
here is worth noting — economic conditions impact transitional justice, and 
not the other way around.Th ese policies might be long in place before a com-
mission reports or a trial concludes. As any observer of transitional criminal 
justice (for example, the ICC ’ s laborious procedures) or truth commissions 
(the South Africa TRC started in 1996, closed its doors in 1998 and issued its 
fi nal report fi ve years later) will note, the fruits of transitional justice are har-
vested long after the agents of the World Bank and the IMF have deployed. 
 6.5. Summary 
 Th e foregoing analysis in this section should make two points clear. Th e 
fi rst is that even if the mechanisms of transitional justice could transcend 
their institutional limitations to make constructive recommendations about 
the distribution of wealth or the promotion of equality, other factors both 
internal and external are at play which will have greater infl uence on pub-
lic policy and in all likelihood will make their impact felt far more quickly. 
Even the best-designed and best-supported measures of justice may clash 
with the competing interests of domestic democratic constituencies (not all 
of whom will be reform-minded), revanchists and the dictates of the global 
economy. Because the rhetoric of redistribution and equality in transitional 
justice literature focusses on meta-level games of state-wide economic justice, 
it neglects the nested games embedded within this general meta-game. 360 
301Rhetoric and Realpolitik
 361.  On the distinction between symbolic repertoires and material resources in this context, 
see Hagmann and P é clard,  ‘ Negotiating Statehood ’ ,  supra note 306, at 547. 
 362.  Ibid , at 545. 
 363.  Notable examples include Waldorf,  ‘ Anticipating the Past ’ ,  supra note 181, at 7; 
Graham K. Brown  et al ,  ‘ Addressing Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Confl ict Recon-
struction ’ , in Aguilar and Gomez Isa (eds),  Rethinking Transitions ,  supra note 77, 11–30 
at 19, 27 and 29; Alexander Segovia,  ‘ Financing Reparations Programs: Refl ections from 
International Experience ’ , in de Greiff  (ed.),  Handbook of Reparations ,  supra note 113, 
650–675 at 669–670. 
While  transitional justice scholars focus on this one over-arching game, other 
games are being played simultaneously by actors (of self-enrichment, politics-
as-usual, globalisation) which serve to constrain eff orts to this end and are 
so complex that the standard encomiums of transitional justice scholarship 
to  do something appear unduly simplistic. Th e assumption that transitional 
justice can exert decisive infl uence in times of transition pays scant regard 
to the generic ecologies of post-authoritarian states. Transitional justice can 
provide a symbolic repertoire of justice, human rights, democracy, develop-
ment and equality to mobilise support for distributive justice or to challenge 
existing power relations. However, it cannot be assumed that this repertoire 
can automatically impact upon the dispersal of material resources that indi-
viduals and organised interest groups have at their disposal — money, land, 
skills, knowledge, violence. 361 
 Contrary to commonsensical assumptions, negotiation does not occur between 
co-equal parties or in an inclusive manner. Rather it engages heterogeneous groups 
with highly diff erentiated assets, entitlements, legitimacy and styles of expression. 
Not everything is or can be negotiated and not everyone takes part in negotiat-
ing statehood. But the political confi gurations and institutional arrangements that 
result from such negotiation processes must be seen as imprints of domination by 
the more powerful over weaker groups. 362 
 Th e second point fl ows naturally from this, namely that the rhetorical charge 
that transitional justice somehow operates as a Trojan horse for neo-liberal 
economics wildly overstates its relevance and impact. Th e internal and exter-
nal pressures on states to resist distribution, welfare and economic inequality 
vastly outweigh the pressure a truth commission or a human rights report 
or a reparations proposal can generate in terms of immediacy, size and sheer 
coercive power. Nevertheless, few advocates of a maximal role for transitional 
justice acknowledge these limitations. 363 Th e best that may be achieved is a 
highly constrained optimum. 
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 7. Conclusion 
 In the terms outlined by Karl Popper, the attempt to expand the scope of 
transitional justice can be seen as a move from piecemeal social engineering 
in the sense of fi ghting against the greatest and most urgent evil of society 
like crimes against humanity and torture to more utopian social engineer-
ing in the sense of fi ghting for a greatest ultimate good, in this case equality 
and welfare. 364 It is a signifi cant evolution, from furthering an incremen-
tal change in a political sphere that is already undergoing regeneration to 
attempting to fundamentally transform a socio-economic sphere that may 
not. Th e enthusiasm and beguiling simplicity with which scholars contend 
that transitional justice can and should go further are intellectually attractive 
and intuitively appealing. However, these arguments are based on two ques-
tionable premises — fi rstly, that political transition opens signifi cant oppor-
tunity for structural transformation, and secondly, that the mechanisms of 
transitional justice have the competence and legitimacy to help eff ect this 
transformation. Th is article has questioned both premises. 
 To begin with the fi rst, it is clear that for a number of reasons political 
transition does not necessarily conduce to a fundamental re-evaluation of 
unjust economic structures. Th e preservation of an unequal economy may be 
the implicit or explicit bargain underpinning political liberalisation, the tran-
sitional state may lack the extractive capacity to redress the perverse incentives 
to maintain a weak state that fl ow from the war economies or authoritarian 
systems, the dictates of global neo-liberalism may exert greater infl uence than 
any national actor in government or transitional justice, and the mandates of 
democratically elected leaders might follow suit. Much, though certainly not 
all, of the socio-economic self-critique of transitional justice misdiagnoses the 
problem — the obstacle to fairer transitional justice is not the narrowness of 
the conception of justice, it is the narrowness of transition. One sees in the 
literature a type of cognitive dissonance — scholars observe on the one hand 
that transition rarely yields better socio-economic outcomes, but yet assume 
transition is automatically propitious time for reform. 365 A more realistic 
assessment of the prospects for addressing unfair societal structures might 
fl ow from a recognition that the factors that compel a more distributive or 
developmental approach to transitional justice also impair it. For example, as 
Holmes observes about Colombia: 
 If part of the purpose of the original confi scations was to reduce the power of the 
peasants, and if this strategy was successful, would-be land reformers today do not 
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have well-organized peasant allies who can help them put land reform into eff ect. 
Th e reason why restitution is needed, in other words, is the same reason why res-
titution is so devilishly diffi  cult. Justice requires that the Colombian peasantry be 
given back the power they have lost; but justice alone does not give them the power 
they need to reestablish their political role in the country. 366 
 Th e impetus towards social justice, development and/or redistribution is 
welcome, but cannot escape the  ‘ moral dilemmas versus practical solutions ’ 
divide which has characterised the fi eld since its earliest days. 367 
 Even if a more benign transition obtains, there must be some doubt that 
transitional justice, for so long concerned with individual conduct and the 
stabilisation of society after the bargains of political elites, can impact signifi -
cantly on the comparatively agent-less, macro-social structures and collective 
processes which underlie poverty and inequality. Even strong advocates of a 
shift from the time-bound and projectisable to an essentially limitless role for 
transitional justice in alleviating the structural causes of confl ict accept that 
the direct developmental impact of trials or truth commissions or reparations 
on growth or distribution of national resources is either minimal or untrace-
able in purely economistic terms. 368 Baldly put, because of its temporary, 
exceptional and often wholly/partly external nature, transitional justice exists 
at a considerable remove from the capture by states, individuals or groups 
of surpluses from production or exchange and the consequent use of those 
surpluses in the service of health, literacy, education, income and employ-
ment. In particular, there is little to suggest those citizens and professionals 
who administer criminal justice, lustration or truth commissions are in any 
better position than development actors, parliamentarians or civil servants to 
examine the fundamental issue of whether a state ’ s developmental or redis-
tribution policy should be based on past suff ering, present needs or future 
effi  ciency. Kerr and Mobekk have argued that the goals of transitional jus-
tice are too ambitious, often  ‘ imposed from elsewhere and not in the power 
of those working within such processes to deliver them. ’ 369 Th is becomes 
apparent on the ground. Peru ’ s Integral Reparations Plan Group made a con-
scious decision to renounce the ambition to remedy the causes of the civil 
confl ict, eschewing an impossible attempt  ‘ to achieve the goals of the whole 
transitional process ’ and preferring instead to address  ‘ just an important piece 
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of it. ’ 370 It is a choice many truth commissions, reparation programs and 
prosecutors will be forced to reach by the pressure of circumstances, and one 
armchair critics might do well to understand more sympathetically. 
 As in many areas of human rights, the norms in question in this debate 
are so fundamental that commitment to equality and poverty alleviation 
 ‘ may dull an appropriately sceptical attitude ’ to what transitional justice can 
do. 371 Th e belief transitional justice can signifi cantly impact the distribution 
of wealth and opportunity in an economy if only practitioners understand 
justice in a more holistic sense exemplifi es the fi eld ’ s technocratic and uto-
pian imperative, relying heavily on a logic of project management in which 
the right combination of technique and planning will accomplish the goals 
set for any given mechanism. 372 Th is  ‘ toolbox ’ approach tends to assume the 
universality of the norms underlying transitional justice as applicable in all 
contexts, an optimism that inevitably disregards local political, social, cultural 
and historical contexts and purports to operate immune to local power strug-
gles and political instrumentalisation. 373 In this manner, the types of  ‘ vague 
statements ’ and  ‘ received wisdom ’ canvassed in Section 3 and 5  ‘ are produced 
about what transitional justice is and how its aims can be achieved. ’ 374 Broad 
generalised aspirations about how transitional justice as a concept can achieve 
socio-economic justice (or heal the traumatised, or end centuries-old cycles 
of violence) have achieved widespread acceptability within the fi eld without 
any attention to the inevitably idiosyncratic and diffi  cult conditions it will be 
applied in. 
 Th e idea that law can displace politics and resolve confl ict is tempting and 
one that has animated transitional justice from the beginning. 375 Th e human-
itarian tendency to assume tools like transitional justice conduce to humani-
tarian outcomes like poverty eradication and socio-economic reform is one all 
policy-makers should be wary of. 376 Because even the most noble intentions 
can fail, scholars and practitioners in the fi eld should be  rigorous about what 
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transitional justice can and cannot do. Th e best transitional  justice strategies 
are those that are clearly defi ned and realistic, while those that are overtasked 
will dash artifi cially elevated expectations and disillusion the public. Schol-
ars now warn that the overpromising regarding transitional justice ’ s trans-
formative macro-economic impact can only lead to unfair assessments that 
the institutions have failed, with a consequent loss of support for transitional 
justice overall. 377 Much of the rhetoric in this debate is unsupportable, and 
the absolutism of the claims makes traditional approaches to truth, justice 
and reparations look like craven betrayal when they may in fact be all political 
conditions and institutional competences allow for. Posner and Vermeule note 
that the literature in the fi eld either condemns transitional justice for failing 
to reach unrealistic ideals of justice or dismisses any eff ort at transitional jus-
tice because it falls short of them. 378 Th e danger is not that transitional justice 
remains unduly limited in its outlook, but rather that overzealous proponents 
of an expanded practice make the perfect the enemy of the good. 
 It is worthwhile, therefore, considering what developmental goods tran-
sitional justice delivers independent of any direct attempt to fundamentally 
alter economic structures. First and foremost, to the extent that transitional 
justice helps stabilise and legitimise the national political community through 
truth, criminal accountability and reparations, it may help inoculate society 
against re-infl ammation of the passions that led to confl ict or repression and 
can then be said to have a developmental impact. Above all else, prevent-
ing further confl ict is the fundamental precondition for achieving poverty 
reduction. 379 In more positive terms, transitional justice can foster the basic 
conditions in which development can occur by fostering a more participa-
tory and inclusive environment, on the one hand, and good governance on 
the other. Th e primary connection between transitional justice and develop-
ment fl ows from the former ’ s ability to establish the rule of law and affi  rm 
the currency of rules and norms. Th is traditional focus on civil and politi-
cal rights has two main impacts. Th e fi rst is that it tends to develop public 
civic trust, an assumption that strangers or institutions comply with abstract 
and general values and norms, which tends to facilitate cheaper, faster and 
fairer economic transitions in economies that go on to enjoy better growth 
and investment. 380 Th e second is the establishment of rights as justifi ed 
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claims that trigger remedies for violation instead of fi xing them merely as 
 aspirations for future conduct. 381 Transitional justice can buttress rule of law 
values like accountability, culpability and duty, potentially creating a culture 
where all rights (civil, political, economic, social and cultural) are enforceable 
and subject to remedies where violated. 382 Given that macro-level social and 
economic development is thought by some to be impossible without a func-
tioning legal system, 383 transitional justice can highlight that functionality in 
a most publically visible manner. 
 If human development is conceived in terms of enlarging peoples ’ choices 
as Sen famously proposed, even a relatively conservative approach to transi-
tional justice can help establish the courts and state as defenders of rights, 
helping the socio-economically marginalised to see themselves as full mem-
bers of the political community. 384 Th e South African judge Albie Sachs 
argues that while dignity, land, jobs and education are the  ‘ real reparation ’ 
people want, there is still much value in apology, shame and humanising the 
relationship between perpetrator and victim. 385 It should not be assumed that 
a concentration on the latter impedes realisation of the former, but much of 
the more enthusiastic rhetoric canvassed earlier does just that. Finally, tran-
sitional justice may contribute to better practice on the part of development 
actors by making them more aware of the eff ect of human rights violations on 
everyday life. It can empower state and non-state actors with a tool to pres-
sure government toward ensuring equitable development. However, scholars 
should be readier to acknowledge that there will be countervailing pressures. 
 Establishing the rule of law and the currency of civil and political rights 
is a necessary condition for development and redistribution, even if it is far 
from suffi  cient. Bearing this and the relative inability of transitional justice 
mechanisms to directly eff ect macro-level economic change in mind, it is 
not necessarily be fatal to hopes for economic equality to postpone highly 
contentious,  potentially transformative transitional justice policies lest they 
undermine the delicate balance of power and compromise that the transi-
tion represents. Development and socio-economic justice are not matters of 
one-off  intervention, but are rather continuous processes of critical dialogue 
with an expanding set of groups and interests to ensure that engagements 
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undertaken refl ect the needs and interests of at least some of these groups, 
including those who benefi tted from past injustice. As Waldorf contends, 
 ‘ the  reduction of longstanding inequality is necessarily  “ post-transition ” —
 something to be accomplished as part of creating an new and hopefully more 
democratic order, ’ 386 though critics are certainly correct to argue that devel-
opment of socio-economic rights cannot be assumed to fl ow automatically 
from positive developments in terms of democratisation and rule of law. 387 
 Andrieu contends that it is the existence of boundaries to transitional jus-
tice that make it an actual theory. Attempts to turn transitional justice into 
a  ‘ catchall formula ’ risk enchanting transitional justice unfairly with 
 ‘ magical powers ’ to transform and regenerate societies, when in reality it is 
better suited to merely addressing individual social ills in the hope that it 
may ultimately contribute to the solution of the state ’ s wider problems. 388 
Th is is a position with which this paper concurs. Th e boundaries of transi-
tional justice may benefi t from some stretching, and few would quibble with 
more prosecutions for kleptocracy or corruption, a more structural remit for 
truth commissions or a more ambitious approach to reparations, but socio-
economic metamorphosis and poverty reduction should not be the metric by 
which transitional justice should be judged. It may be necessary to compro-
mise or abandon some of the undoubtedly laudable principles, assumptions 
and ideals inherent in the expansionary position for the sake of retaining the 
coherence, saleability and reputation of transitional justice. 
 Without attention to the dynamics of transition and the weakness of 
the state, arguments that transitional justice practitioners should  ‘ turn the 
majority of their attention and resources to eff orts that directly target exist-
ing structural and cultural violence ’ 389 or formulate a  ‘ holistic and compre-
hensive settlement addressing the foundational problems ’ that unleashed 
confl ict 390 risk re-hashing the simplistic rhetoric and sloganeering advice that 
mar debates on the protection of socio-economic rights. 391 Th is conclusion 
is not to counsel hopelessness about the prospects of redressing long-term 
patterns of inequality in transitional states, but rather modesty about what 
can be achieved in the radically imperfect ecology of weak, impoverished and 
divided states. 
